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I.  Introduction 
The United States stands out among developed nations for both its extremely punitive 
illegal drug policy and the high percentages of its population that have consumed banned 
substances—particularly marijuana and cocaine.  The war against the millions of Americans who 
use and sell these drugs has cost taxpayers billions of dollars each year and contributed 
substantially to America’s globally unmatched incarceration rate (Walmsley 2009).
1 Yet it has 
failed to displace America from among the world leaders in use rates for illegal drugs even if 
escalating punitiveness may have contributed to declines in U.S. drug consumption from its 
peaks in the late 1970s and 1980s.  
To locate America’s illegal drug policy globally and along a spectrum of potential 
alternatives, it is helpful to consider three broad approaches governments may take toward drugs: 
(1) legalization—a system in which possession and sale are lawful but subject to regulation and 
taxation (U.S. policy for alcohol and tobacco);
2 (2) criminalization—a system of proscriptions on 
possession and sale backed by criminal punishment, potentially including incarceration (U.S. 
policy for marijuana, cocaine, and other illegal drugs); and (3) depenalization—a hybrid system, 
in which sale and possession are proscribed, but the prohibition on possession is backed only by 
such sanctions as fines or mandatory substance abuse treatment, not incarceration
3 (U.S. policy 
toward alcohol during Prohibition).
4  All three of these approaches have been implemented in the 
practices of various governments around the world, though to greater and lesser extents. Nearly 
all countries have criminalized a consistent set of proscribed substances including marijuana, 
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine; most have also legalized other drugs such as alcohol and 
tobacco; and some have adopted policies of depenalization for substances whose sale, and to 
some degree possession, remains prohibited.
5  
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We begin our analysis in Section II by attempting to define America’s illegal drug 
problem, first sketching consumption patterns, current policy, and the social costs of illegal drugs 
under America’s basic regime of criminalization.  Because America’s illegal drug policies are an 
integral part of the context in which those costs arise—and many of those costs, such as those 
associated with incarceration, would not exist but for America’s current policies—we consider 
current policies and social costs in tandem, distinguishing costs that stem from criminalization 
and costs that flow from psychopharmacological effects of drugs on their users.  Following this 
overview, we focus in Section III on the particular cases of marijuana and cocaine. For both 
marijuana and cocaine, we analyze three potential regimes—criminalization, depenalization, and 
legalization.  We also address the two most significant sources of social costs from cocaine: 
crime and incarceration.  
Marijuana is the most widely used illegal drug in America (as elsewhere) and the one 
with the most vocal advocates for legalization.  Cocaine has been an especially acute problem in 
America, with the prevalence of this drug and its derivative, crack, providing the impetus for the 
escalation of the War on Drugs in the 1980s and Plan Colombia in the 1990s. We restrict our 
discussion to these two drugs partly because one of our principal contentions is that analysis of 
illegal drug policy from a perspective of minimizing social costs requires great focus on the 
varying burdens of individual drugs given their different toxicological and inherent criminogenic 
effects, and their distinct patterns of consumption and distribution. 
  Under U.S. criminalization of marijuana, a large number of people are arrested and 
otherwise punished for possession of a substance that is routinely consumed in today’s 
developed world and is—by various expert accounts and along many measures—less dangerous 
to users and society than cigarettes or alcohol. This policy not only consumes criminal justice  
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resources and crowds out other valuable social spending, it also creates hard-to-quantify costs in 
other forms: diminished respect for the law, loss of faith in government warnings about the 
serious dangers posed by more harmful drugs, and a morally arbitrary arrest lottery undermining 
the principle that like offenders be treated equally. On the other hand, cocaine is substantially 
more dangerous than marijuana and under criminalization it is much more socially costly in the 
aggregate, notwithstanding far lower rates of use. The costs of cocaine under criminalization 
overwhelmingly stem from crime, violence, and incarceration.  
The differing nature of the costs of criminalization for marijuana and cocaine is important 
because it suggests that the effect of a regime change (e.g., from criminalization to 
depenalization or legalization) would be different for marijuana than for cocaine. Depenalization 
and legalization could both potentially reduce perhaps the foremost cost of marijuana 
criminalization: the extremely high number of arrests for possession, and the concomitant 
burdens they impose on the criminal justice system’s resources and individual arrestees—many 
of whom are otherwise law-abiding.
6 Legalization, to a much greater extent than depenalization, 
would reduce the costs of black-market violence and lengthy incarceration for sellers that weigh 
so heavily in the overall costs of cocaine.  
On the other hand, economic theory suggests that reductions in sanctions through 
depenalization or legalization would lower costs both implicit (such as time spent and risk 
incurred to obtain the drug) and explicit (the per unit dollar price of the drug), and thereby 
increase demand and use. By more substantially reducing costs and government disapproval, and 
by potentially enabling advertising, legalization would be expected to lead to higher levels of 
consumption than under a regime of depenalization. The possible exception to this claim would 
be if legalization were accompanied by a sufficiently comprehensive taxation regime that would  
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restrain consumption by maintaining a high enough price to the consumer.  The 
psychopharmacological effects of cocaine are markedly more harmful than those of marijuana, 
and the costs per additional user would be higher for cocaine than marijuana. Moreover, 
marijuana consumption is much higher than cocaine consumption so the offsetting effect of tax 
revenues on the social costs of cocaine would be much less significant than for marijuana.   
In sum, legalizing cocaine would pose greater risks and offer greater potential rewards 
than legalizing marijuana: the decreases in certain categories of costs and increases in others 
would be much more substantial for cocaine than for marijuana. 
Not surprisingly, much of the debate over illegal drug policy and potential reforms hinges 
on two contentious questions. First, by how much would the prevalence and intensity of a drug’s 
use rise under a different regime?
7 Second, would reductions in other social costs—particularly 
through lower rates of crime and criminal justice enforcement costs—outweigh the costs of 
increased consumption?  
Our nation’s experience with alcohol regulation is instructive.  During Prohibition—a 
regime of decriminalization or extreme depenalization—alcohol consumption was suppressed 
(from higher rates under legalization) to a degree that noticeably lowered the cost of alcohol 
abuse. These gains, however, appear to have come at a high cost in terms of crime, which fell 
sharply after Prohibition ended. While criminal gangs no longer cause mayhem over alcohol 
distribution, alcohol abuse does lead to belligerence and crime as well as many other social costs 
ranging from impaired productivity and increased motor-vehicle deaths to higher levels of child 
abuse and neglect.  The U.S. has vastly more alcoholics than drug addicts in part because we 
have allowed a free market coupled with extensive advertising to promote alcohol consumption, 
with taxation levels that are well below social costs.    
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Conjectures from some sources that similarly free markets for cocaine could increase 
today’s relatively small number of cocaine addicts to levels beyond the current number of 
alcoholics are offered in support of the current war on drugs.  Opponents counter by pointing to 
the enormous criminal violence—here and abroad—that this war has generated, as well as the 
500,000 incarcerated Americans whose lost freedom and productivity are among the greatest 
casualties of the war on drugs.  The stakes are high for illicit drug policy, yet unfortunately we 
must continually choose its contours (for maintaining the status quo is itself a choice) with a less 
than ideal evidentiary base. 
Legalization would almost certainly reduce crime, but such a prospective gain must be 
weighed against the increase in the costs of substance abuse that would likely follow.  The 
murder and violence of illegal drug dealing, and the hundreds of thousands of ruined lives of 
prison inmates must be assessed against increased motor vehicle deaths and potentially millions 
of lives impaired by addiction.  These are not pretty or easy choices, and to a significant extent 
the consequences of various drug policy regimes will depend upon the specifics of design and 
implementation. Our effort here is directed toward clarifying the tradeoffs by exploring, in the 
contexts of marijuana and cocaine, the question of which regime—and what set of policies 
within that overarching framework—would minimize the total cost to society.
8 
 
II. Defining America’s Illegal Drug Problem 
a.  Consumption Patterns 
 
i.  Consumption Across Users 
 
As Figure 1 reveals, according to the WHO World Mental Health Surveys taken in the 
2000s, 42 percent of American adults have tried cannabis, more than twice the take-up rate in  
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any of the 17 countries studied other than New Zealand, which trailed closely behind the United 
States (Degenhardt et al. 2008).
9   Figure 2 illustrates that the percentage of Americans ever 
consuming cocaine is even more extreme: sixteen percent of American adults have tried cocaine, 
dwarfing the next highest rates of about four percent in Colombia, Mexico, Spain, and New 
Zealand and the under two percent rates in other European countries, the Middle East, Africa, 
and Asia (Degenhardt et al. 2008). As Figure 7 and Figure 8 reveal, annual use figures are 
naturally lower, but the U.S. also stands near the top in terms of rates of past-year use. Figure 3 
and Figure 4 provide comparable data on lifetime use rates of tobacco and alcohol, the two most 
socially costly legal drugs. While U.S. consumption levels for these legal substances are not low, 
they stand out less in the global context than U.S. use rates of marijuana and cocaine.
10 If our 
severe criminalization has been effective at reducing the prevalence of marijuana and cocaine, 
however, then use rates in the U.S. are actually markedly lower than they would be were we to 
follow other countries’ examples and move away from our distinctly punitive approach. One’s 
assessment of the effectiveness of our illegal drug policy is partly tied to one’s assessment of that 
counterfactual world.
11  
Insert Figure 1, 2, 3 and 4 about here 
  A recurring pattern in the distribution of consumption across users holds for a variety of 
recreational drugs: a small percentage of users account for a large percentage of consumption. 
This pattern is found for alcohol consumption in the United States (Cook 2007, 57), as well as 
for cocaine use. For example, one study found that the top 22 percent of users account for 70 
percent of cocaine consumption (NRC 2001, 60; see also Rydell and Everingham 1994, finding 
that heavy cocaine users consume cocaine at a rate nearly eight times that of light users). The top 
heaviness of the distribution of cocaine use among consumers is believed to have increased from  
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the early 1980s when consumption was nearly evenly split between light users and heavy users 
(NRC 2001, 60). Reuter (1999b, 17-18) characterizes cocaine as a “career” rather than an 
“event,” because as they come to appreciate the harmful consequences of the drug, the casual 
users quit, leaving in place a core of more serious users. Marijuana consumption is concentrated 
among individuals in their late teens and their twenties.  Most consumers use the drug relatively 
infrequently and for relatively short periods of time (MacCoun and Reuter 2001, 342).  Taken as 
a whole, these drug use distribution patterns suggest that the most severe problems stemming 
from drug use are concentrated within a relatively small percentage of users. 
The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (NCADD 2002) relies on a 
2001 study by the Schneider Institute for Health Policy at Brandeis University, Substance Abuse: 
The Nation’s Number One Health Problem, for the claim that about 18 million Americans have 
alcohol problems and 5 to 6 million Americans have (illegal) drug problems (SIHP 2001). A 
similar set of estimates—not of “alcoholics” and problem users but of abusive or “dependent” 
users—comes from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) from 2007 
(SAMHSA 2008). The study found that in 2007, approximately 22.3 million people aged 12 or 
older had, in the past year, abused or experienced dependence on alcohol, illegal drugs, or both: 
15.5 million abused or depended upon alcohol, 3.2 million on alcohol and illegal drugs, and 3.7 
million on illegal drugs but not alcohol (SAMHSA 2008, 71).
12 
The NSDUH methodology uses various questions to classify persons as “dependent” 
upon or “abusing” different substances based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV). As the report puts it:  
Dependence is considered to be a more severe substance use problem than abuse 
because it involves the psychological and physiological effects of tolerance and  
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withdrawal. Although individuals may meet the criteria specified here for both 
dependence and abuse, persons meeting the criteria for both are classified as 
having dependence, but not abuse. Persons defined with abuse in this report do 
not meet the criteria for dependence (SAMHSA 2008, 71). 
 
The plight of drug users who are deemed to be in the thrall of addiction, abuse, or 
dependence is central to understanding illegal drug policy. Those who advocate maintaining 
severe criminalization frequently raise the specter of ballooning addiction to make 
depenalization or legalization seem intolerably reckless.
13  They argue, consistent with the 
dominant understanding of addiction today as a disease, that once addiction sets in, individuals 
find themselves caught in a pattern of self-destructive behavior that is nearly impossible to 
escape. Severe sanctions for use, on this account, offer a strong incentive to avoid initiating the 
addiction cycle and to get out of it once it begins.  
Yet there are fundamental tensions within the viewpoint just described. First, if punitive 
treatment of users reduces the number of people trying illegal drugs (and perhaps in turn the 
number who become perpetual users), it may conflict with the aim of providing problem users 
with the therapeutic treatment they need to wean themselves from drugs.  It is not simply that 
governments with punitive dispositions divert resources that could be used on treatment 
programs. Punitive criminalization may create fears of punishment and demonization that 
directly discourage users from seeking treatment.  The Economist recently noted that in Portugal, 
which decriminalized possession of illegal drugs in 2001, “[t]he number of addicts registered in 
drug-substitution programmes has risen from 6,000 in 1999 to over 24,000 in 2008, reflecting a 
big rise in treatment (but not in drug use)” (Treating Not Punishing 2009).
14  The United States  
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has tried a different approach, using criminalization as a vehicle to promote treatment by 
sometimes offering it as an alternative to, or a means of reducing, criminal penalties.
15  
Second, the generally accepted view—outside of some Chicago school theoretical 
musings of the late 1960s and early 1970s—has long been that swift and certain sanctions are 
more salient, and effective at deterring than more distant and uncertain punishments of greater 
severity. Kleiman (2009) has stressed the intractable tradeoff between swiftness and severity in 
punishment. As he puts it: 
One problem with the brute-force, high-severity approach is that severity is 
incompatible with swiftness and certainty. Severity means using a large share of 
punishment resources on a (relatively) few offenders, and (as the American 
experience with capital punishment since its reintroduction illustrates) the more 
severe a sentence is the more reluctantly it will be imposed and the more “due 
process”—and therefore the more time—it will require. (Kleiman 2009, 3) 
 
The greater deterrence value of more immediate and likely sanctions seems especially important 
given the apparent risk and time preferences of drug users—individuals whose behavior suggests 
a present-moment orientation and a heavy discounting of future burdens. An experiment with 
offenders on probation in Honolulu, for example, which tested the effect of a program oriented 
around imminent but short incarceration for violators, found that program participants were 55 
percent less likely to be arrested for a new crime and 72 percent less likely to test positive for 
drug use (Hawken and Kleiman 2009, 64). 
Third, to the extent that addiction means a lack of voluntariness on the part of the addict, 
sanctioning addicts with the full brunt of criminal law is in tension with the core American 
criminal law requirements of mens rea and actus reus. If drug addiction is characterized by  
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involuntariness, then addicted users appear neither culpable to a degree meriting criminal 
sanctions
16 nor likely to be deterred by such punishment. On the other hand, if drug addiction is a 
disorder of choice, as some have recently and compellingly argued on the basis of strong 
evidence that most addicts recover,
17 then an internalities-based justification of criminalization is 
weakened: addiction begins to look less like an irreversible step into self-destruction and more 
like a habit that individuals will struggle over, but quite likely eventually overcome.  The greater 
the degree of choice involved, the less catastrophic is initiation into use and even addiction, and 
the less justifiable are the costly sanctions designed in large part to keep individuals from ever 
experimenting with illegal drugs.  
The significance of addicts in aggregate marijuana and cocaine consumption is important 
to bear in mind when considering the effect of changes in price—and policy shifts that would 
affect a drug’s price, such as changes to criminal sanctions, depenalization, or legalization—on 
the prevalence and intensity of use. Initially, one might assume that non-addicts and prospective 
dabblers would be more responsive to changes in price than addicts, whose compulsive behavior 
is often equated with an inability to quit, rising costs notwithstanding. According to this line of 
thinking, marginal increases in price—through, say, more severe criminal penalties—would 
affect casual users much more than heavy users, thus decreasing aggregate harms of use only by 
changing the behavior of marginal users, without substantially diminishing the core of problem 
users. A lower price resulting from more lenient policies would induce some new users whose 
intensity of use would be harder to predict—though a reasonable assumption might be that the 
new group would contain no greater percentage of addicts than the initial population of users.
18  
However, it is also possible—and consistent with the economic model of rational 
addiction put forth by Becker and Murphy (1988)
19—that addicts will be responsive to price  
  11
changes over longer time spans. While neither we nor Becker and Murphy believe that all 
addictive behavior can be explained adequately as the rational pursuit of welfare maximization,
20 
their model highlights an important theoretical consideration in attempting to assess the impacts 
of actual and hypothetical policy changes (and concomitant drug prices) on use: time horizon. 
One reason among many for caution in extrapolating from the results of short-lived policy 
experiences is that a policy affecting the use rate of a drug through the price mechanism may 
have a substantially greater impact if retained over a long period of time. Provocatively, the 
model put forth by Becker and Murphy suggests that in the long run, consumption of addictive 
goods may be even more responsive to price changes than consumption of nonaddictive goods.
21 
In the long run at least, price changes may indeed expand or contract the core of problem users. 
Another factor to take into account when considering consumption across users is the age 
at which users are most likely to become addicted to illicit substances.  In surveys of individuals 
in the United States, psychiatric researchers have found that drug abuse disorders, excluding 
alcohol, have a lifetime prevalence of 8.5 percent, and that age 19 is the median age-of-onset for 
such disorders (Kessler et al. 2005, 595).  More importantly, these same surveys indicate that 
drug abuse disorders have a narrow age-of-onset range, with an interquartile range of 17-23 
years (Kessler et al.). This suggests that efforts aimed at curtailing drug use among young people 
can play a key role in preventing drug addiction.  Individuals who do not develop a disorder by 
their late twenties are much less likely ever to develop such a disorder.
22 Therefore, finding ways 
to limit access to drugs among children and teens should be central to any regime—and any 
depenalization or legalization proposal. 
 
ii.  Consumption Across History 
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Simply identifying the trends in illegal drug use over time is a difficult task, given the 
obvious obstacles to securing accurate information about illegal behavior over extended periods 
of time.  A number of surveys of illegal drug use include the percentages of individuals reporting 
to have used in the past month, past year, and ever. These are often broken down by drug and 
user characteristics—most notably age group. While the percentage of a population using a drug 
during a given time period is a valuable measure, all such statistics are limited in that they do not 
capture other important variables such as quantities and potencies used by individuals, much less 
the severity of harms associated with the instances of use.
23 
Even if one accepts the accuracy of the data, one must also use caution in analyzing 
historical data regarding drug use trends.  There is a natural—but potentially misguided—
tendency to equate periods of low prevalence with successful policy and to attribute spikes in the 
percentage of users with policy failings. Even if prevalence of use were the sole criterion by 
which to measure the success of drug policy, it would remain extremely difficult to attribute 
causation to specific policies given the myriad other social factors that influence use. 
With those provisos in mind, it is worth taking a cursory look at historical trends in the 
use of marijuana and cocaine in the United States. In Figure 5 we report data from the 
Monitoring the Future surveys
24 on the percentage of high school seniors reporting use of 
marijuana, cocaine, any illegal drug, and any illegal drug other than marijuana, within the past 30 
days. While these are relatively narrow measures, we present them not just for the intrinsic 
significance of use prevalence among late adolescents, but also because they are broadly 
consistent with overall prevalence and have the important advantage of consistent tracking over a 
long period of time. 
Insert Figure 5 about here  
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As Figure 5 suggests, the percentage of high school seniors who recently used marijuana 
reached a peak during the late 1970s, declined until the early 1990s, rose during the mid-to-late 
part of that decade and has since leveled and begun to decline in the 2000s. The percentage of 
high school seniors who recently used cocaine rose through the late 1970s, stayed high in the 
early 1980s, rose again in the middle of the decade, then declined by its end, falling until the 
early 1990s, after which time it rose fairly modestly by historical standards, then leveled.  The 
tight correlation between the percentage using marijuana and the percentage using any illegal 
drug is broadly consistent with drug use trends—not just in the United States, but globally as 
well. This correlation is quite common across populations because the percentage of individuals 
around the world using marijuana dwarfs the percentage using all other illegal drugs.  
Figure 5 might be taken to suggest that the “Just Say No” campaign of the Reagan years 
led to a major decline in consumption that was reversed during the more permissive Clinton 
years, although one must consider whether the Reagan campaign influenced reporting behavior 
as well as drug use.  In addition, scholars have offered two reasons to doubt that policy changes 
in the U.S. can explain the declines in cocaine and marijuana use from the mid-eighties through 
the early nineties, the subsequent rise in use during the 1990s or the leveling off in the new 
century. First, drug use has in a number of instances followed the trajectories of epidemics—
wherein use has increased continuously until reaching a plateau, then diminishing, likely due in 
part to greater awareness of the harmful consequences of use. Second, as Room et al. (2008, 15) 
note, regarding cannabis: 
Interestingly, there seems to be a common pattern over time across countries. For 
most western nations between 1991 and 1998 there was an increase of about half 
in the proportion of 18 year olds reporting that they had tried cannabis. Since  
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1998 in the same countries there has been a substantial decline in that figure, 
though in 2006 it still remains well above the 1991 level…The common patterns 
across countries with very different policy approaches reinforce the general 
impression that penalties for personal use have very little impact on the 
prevalence of cannabis use in a society.  
 
b.  Current Policy 
i.  America’s Punitive Approach 
No responsible analysis of the harmful consequences of drug use can ignore the 
possibility that many of the harms of drug use are either caused or augmented by 
the legal prohibition against these drugs and its enforcement. Drug prohibition is 
inevitably a source of government intrusion into citizens’ lives. Many (but not all) 
overdoses occur due to the unknown purity and potency of illegally purchased 
drugs. The sharing of contaminated syringes is largely a consequence of the 
artificial scarcity created by their illegality. And much of the criminality and 
violence associated with drug use (but by no means all) is due to the high price of 
illegal drugs and the conditions of their sale in illegal markets. 
-National Research Council, Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs 
(2001, 63). 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that across the array of five broad areas in which the federal 
government spends resources to control drug use, the dominant growth in spending since the 
initiation of the war on drugs has come in the area of domestic criminal enforcement.  The 
federal government’s categorical classification of drug prohibition spending changed after 2001.  
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However, in the past decade, federal drug policy has continued to shift its emphasis toward the 
supply side (ONDCP 2009, 15). As we will later show more directly, disaggregating the costs 
associated with America’s illegal drug problem under the current drug-control policy approach 
underscores that many of the social costs of illegal drugs arise not from drug use per se but rather 
from drug control.
25 In this section, we examine the punitive side of America’s current drug 
policies, focusing on the costs of incarceration.   
Insert Figure 6 about here 
Current U.S. drug control policy is largely punitive in nature. In 2007, law enforcement 
agencies nationwide made over 1.8 million arrests for drug abuse violations, more arrests than 
for any other category of offense (BJS 2009, 1). Of these arrests, approximately four-fifths were 
for possession, with 42.1 percent resulting from marijuana possession and 21.5 percent from 
heroin or cocaine possession (BJS 2009).  The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
has found that the largest cost increases in the war on drugs from 1992 to 2002 came as a result 
of increased incarceration rates for drug offenses and drug-related offenses and from the law 
enforcement and judicial proceedings needed to put offenders in prison (ONDCP 2004, vi).  
Now imprisoning a greater percentage of its population than any other country 
(Walmsley 2009), the U.S. has less than five percent of the world’s population but nearly 25 
percent of its prisoners (A Nation of Jailbirds 2009). The punitive focus of U.S. drug policy is a 
major component of our country’s record-sized prison populations. The American incarceration 
rate has increased greatly since President Ronald Reagan’s emphasis on the war on drugs in the 
early 1980s. The number incarcerated in prison or jail on drug charges is estimated have risen 
from about 40,000 in 1980 to about 500,000 today—more than the total number incarcerated for 
all offenses thirty years ago (Mauer 2009, 1). As of 2004, drug offenders constituted an  
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estimated 55 percent of the federal prison population and 21 percent of the state prison 
population (Mumola and Karberg 2007).
26 
Though most arrests involving drug offenses are for possession, most individuals serving 
prison sentences for drug offenses are behind bars for trafficking offenses, not just possession. In 
1999, the most recent year for which the Bureau of Justice Statistics did a comprehensive report 
on federal drug offenders, simple possession was the most serious offense for only 2.1 percent of 
drug offense suspects referred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution, whereas for 97.5 percent, drug 
trafficking was the most serious offense (BJS 2001, 2).
27  In terms of drugs involved for 
defendants actually convicted of federal drug offenses, 30.6 percent involved marijuana, 22.4 
percent involved crack cocaine, 21.5 percent involved cocaine powder, 12.5 percent involved 
methamphetamine, 7.8 percent involved opiates, 0.5 percent involved hallucinogens, and 4.8 
percent other substances (BJS 2001, 9).  
Unsurprisingly, the percentage of incarcerated drug offenders serving time for possession 
appears to be significantly greater in state as opposed to federal prisons. Analyzing data from the 
2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, Mumola and Karberg (2007, 
4) report that in 2004, 5.3 percent of drug offenders in federal prisons and 27.9 percent of drug 
offenders in state prisons were incarcerated for possession. The authors found that of drug 
offenders held in state prisons, 61.8 percent reported that cocaine or crack was involved in their 
offenses, and the analogous figures were 18.6 percent for stimulants, 12.7 percent for marijuana 
or hashish, 12.2 percent for heroin and other opiates, 2.2 percent for depressants, and 1.7 percent 
for hallucinogens.
28 One must interpret these data with caution. First, just 20.7 percent of drug 
offenders in state prisons reported having no prior criminal history (Mumola and Karberg 2007, 
4). Second, given the pervasiveness of plea bargaining and the evidentiary ease of prosecuting  
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possession relative to other offenses, the percentage of convicts incarcerated in state prisons 
whose most severe offense truly is possession remains somewhat illusive.  
The price of keeping hundreds of thousands of drug offenders behind bars is high and 
rising.  Locking up approximately half-a-million drug offenders has a direct budgetary cost in the 
billions each year—approximately $6.6 billion for state drug prisoners and perhaps that sum over 
again for federal prisoners and convicts serving time in jail.
29 In addition to the costs of 
incarceration borne by government and prisoners, a large toll falls on the families of those 
incarcerated, partly in terms of lost incomes, many of which were lawful ones (Donohue 2009). 
Fifty-nine percent of male state and federal inmates in prison for drug possession or trafficking 
have minor children, whereas in the general prison population, only fifty-one percent have 
children, indicating an additional cost stemming from high incarceration rates in the form of 
children with absent fathers (BJS 2008, 4).  
There is also a startling racial disparity in imprisonment for drug charges.  In state 
prisons, African-Americans account for 38.6 percent of prisoners overall and 45.1 percent of 
prisoners convicted of drug offenses (Sabol, Couture and Harrison 2007, 24), though they 
represent just 13 percent of the U.S. population (US Census Bureau 2008).
30 There is also  
evidence that a substantial portion of racial profiling problems result from the targeting of drug 
sellers through criminal enforcement efforts, which could be greatly reduced under a less 
punitive drug policy.  
 
ii.  America in a Global Perspective 
With the aim of devising rational drug policies based on practical experience rather than 
predominantly ideological concerns, countries throughout Europe are experimenting with drug  
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policy in a variety of ways. In general, European countries have less punitive—and more harm-
reduction oriented—approaches to drug policy than the United States.  The Action Plan adopted 
by the German government in 2003 to deal with Germany’s drug problem is representative of 
this approach, claiming:  “The ‘Action Plan on Drugs and Addiction’ advocates a realistic drug 
policy.  It responds more to the concrete reality of life than to any ideological principles.  Every 
addict must have access to appropriate therapy options” (Caspers-Merk 2003, 7).  The plan 
encompasses both legal and illegal substances, recognizing that far more Germans suffer 
substance abuse problems related to tobacco and alcohol than illegal drugs (11-12).     
Portugal has become the poster child of European drug reform following its July 1, 2001 
decriminalization of formerly illicit substances.
31 Rather than handle drug possession and use as 
a criminal matter, the police in Portugal give a civil citation to those caught using or possessing a 
quantity of drugs less than the average amount sufficient for ten-day use by one person.  As 
Greenwald (2009, 3) notes, these civil citations instruct recipients to appear before a “dissuasion 
commission” within seventy-two hours. The dissuasion commission, which is designed to avoid 
all appearances of a criminal tribunal, is made up of a lawyer and two members of the medical 
profession, and it may order those caught with drugs to pay a fine or undergo a course of 
treatment.  Greenwald reports, however, that fines are a last resort designed to be suspended 
except for addicts and repeat offenders, who can have their fines suspended as well, if they agree 
to treatment (3).
32 
Even European countries that have not followed the extreme depenalization approach of 
Portugal have experimented with less punitive and more treatment-oriented drug policies. In 
Switzerland, for example, cannabis use remains a criminal offense (Room et al. 2008, 117).  
However, Switzerland experimented with a regime of open sales of small quantities of illicit  
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drugs, such as heroin, in Zurich’s Platzspitz (the so-called “Needle Park”) (MacCoun and Reuter 
2005, 264). This experiment lasted only five years, from 1987-1992, because the park became 
unsightly and was viewed as an embarrassment by the city. Instead of resorting to strict punitive 
measures for drug use, Switzerland then instituted a heroin maintenance program that allowed 
heroin addicts to receive daily heroin shots supervised by a nurse in a clinical setting. 
Switzerland has since expanded this program due to evidence that crime rates and unemployment 
rates among participants drop during participation (266-67). Similar programs have been 
instituted with encouraging results in Vancouver, Canada, and the Netherlands (Reuter 2009).  
But the trend toward decriminalization of drugs is not universal: the United Kingdom has 
gone in the other direction in recent years, at least with respect to marijuana, by increasing the 
maximum penalties for marijuana use. Gordon Brown’s government decided to reclassify 
cannabis from a Class C drug to a more serious Class B drug, resulting in a maximum penalty of 
fourteen years of imprisonment for marijuana supplying, dealing, producing, and trafficking, and 
five years for possession (Room et al. 2008, 92-93). However, while the potential for such 
penalties exists, the British Home Office describes the “likely” enforcement steps: for a first 
possession offense police will issue a warning, for a second they will issue a Penalty Notice for 
Disorder (a civil citation resulting in an 80 Pound fee), and for a third, they will arrest the 
individual (Home Office 2009). Thus, even in one of Europe’s strictest drug regimes, arrests and 
criminal punishment are reserved for repeat offenders.  
While many European countries have more liberal policies toward drug possession, they 
generally continue to have strict penalties for drug trafficking―though these are appreciably less 
severe than their counterpart American punishments.  As the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction puts it, “[o]ver the past ten years, most European countries have  
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moved towards an approach that distinguishes between the drug trafficker, who is viewed as a 
criminal, and the drug user, who is seen more as a sick person who is in need of treatment” 
(EMCDDA 2008, 22). For example, in spite of their relatively liberal policies toward drug users, 
the maximum drug trafficking penalty in the Netherlands is, nominally at least, 16 years (DEA 
2005, 255).  Even in Portugal, drug trafficking remains a criminal offense because it involves 
possession in excess of the average dose needed for ten days of personal use (Greenwald 2009, 
3).  Relative to America, Europe has focused more on helping rather than punishing problem 
users, while still attempting to disrupt large-scale drug networks. 
Europe is not the only region of the world to have largely eliminated or reduced the 
penalties associated with possessing and using certain drugs.  Latin America has also trended 
toward decriminalization in recent years.  The Argentine Supreme Court decriminalized 
possession of small amounts of marijuana in August of 2009 (Brice 2009).  The court based its 
ruling on the grounds that it is unconstitutional to punish adults for private use of marijuana if 
that use does not harm anyone else (Moffett 2009).
33  In declaring unconstitutional a law that 
provided for sentences of up to two years for drug possession, the court also opened the door for 
possible decriminalization of other substances, because the specific law overturned was not 
limited to marijuana. Lower courts might expand the ruling to other drugs. Following the court 
ruling, the chief of the Argentine cabinet praised the decision for challenging an American-style 
war on drugs by ending “the repressive policy that the Nixon administration invented” (Brice 
2009). 
A few days prior to the Argentine court ruling, Mexico enacted decriminalization 
legislation specifying that individuals in possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, 
heroin, and methamphetamine will not be criminally prosecuted (Luhnow and de Cordoba 2009;  
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Wilkinson 2009).  The new Mexican regime is similar to the Portuguese decriminalization in that 
those caught by police possessing a small amount of drugs will be encouraged to seek treatment 
(Luhnow and de Cordoba).  After being caught three times with drugs, the user will be required 
to attend treatment.  Unlike the prior presidential administration, which sharply criticized earlier 
attempts by Mexico to decriminalize drugs, President Obama’s drug czar, Gil Kerlikowske, said 
that the Administration would evaluate the new Mexican law using a “wait and see” approach 
(Luhnow and de Cordoba).  
In recent years both Brazil and Ecuador have also signaled that they may follow the path 
of Argentina and Mexico toward decriminalization (Moffett 2009).  Taken together, these 
developments reflect the dissatisfaction many Latin American governments have with America’s 
punitive war on drugs:  a war that was started in large part to combat drug production and 
trafficking emanating from Latin America.  While it is too soon to tell what effects the Argentine 
and Mexican reforms will have on use rates in those countries, we will show in subsequent 
sections that the European experience casts doubt on prohibitionist fears that drug use will 
inevitably jump sharply. 
 
c.  Defining the Costs 
 
i.  Aggregating the Costs 
 
The social costs of recreational drug use in America have been staggering and unabated.  
According to the ONDCP’s most recent estimate, the economic cost of illegal drug use in the 
United States in 2002—including lost productivity, health effects, and crime-related costs such 
as policing expenditures and incarceration—was $180.9 billion, having grown at an average rate 
of 5.3 percent annually since 1992 (ONDCP 2004, vi).
34 The costs of two legal drugs—alcohol  
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and tobacco—are of a similar order of magnitude.  The most recent comprehensive estimate of 
Harwood (2000) puts the annual economic cost of alcohol use at $184.6 billion in 1998.
35  Rice 
(1999) estimates the annual economic cost of smoking in 1995 was $138 billion.  Placing these 
figures in constant 2008 dollars provides a set of crude estimates of current annual social costs of 
alcohol ($244 billion), tobacco smoking ($195 billion), and illegal drugs ($217 billion).
36 
Commentators have rightly pointed out that such cost figures give a misleading 
impression of precision, ignore the benefits of drug use,
37 and provide scant direction for actual 
drug policy.
38 We offer these cost estimates for a crude sense of the scale of the problems under 
the current regime and as a reference point from which to examine the various types of costs 
associated with drug use—their relative magnitudes, who causes them, and who bears their 
burdens. It is also worth noting, however, that while such aggregate figures aspire to capture the 
domestic costs of illegal drugs, the costs imposed on foreign countries by the combination of 
America’s exceptionally large demand for illegal drugs coupled with its severe attempts at 
prohibition are also high and growing.  Organized criminals from the Taliban in Afghanistan to 
drug cartels in Colombia and Mexico are enriched by America’s drug consumption and 
prohibition policy, with many highly unpleasant consequences.  The current American 
administration has shown some signs of appreciating the magnitude of the role played by 
American drug demand in fostering crime in foreign countries.   Following the recent wave of 
increasingly deadly gang violence near the Mexican-American border, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton surprised the media by candidly admitting that American drug consumers support crime 
in Mexico fueled by drug profits (Landler 2009).
39  Consideration of these foreign costs (and 
their domestic repercussions) might bring total social costs of illegal drugs to equal or exceed 
those of alcohol.  
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ii.  Disaggregating the Costs 
The social costs of drug use come in many different forms.  Adapting a list from a 1996 
article by MacCoun et al. (1996), the National Research Council (NRC 2001, 54) lists sixteen 
different categories of drug-related harms:  
physical/mental illnesses; diseases transmitted to others; accident victimization; 
health care costs (drug treatment); health care costs (drug-related illnesses, 
injuries); reduced performance in school; reduced performance at workplace; poor 
parenting, child abuse; psychopharmacological crime and violence; economically 
motivated crime and violence; fear and disorder caused by users and dealers; 
criminal justice costs; corruption of legal authorities; strain on source country-
relations; infringements on liberty and privacy;  and violation of the law as an 
intrinsic harm.  
 
It is striking, though, how large a portion of the social costs of drug use today arises from 
a single source with a broad reach: drug-related crime. Viewed as an isolated statistic, the 
ONDCP’s estimate of the social costs of drug abuse provides little insight into the nature of 
America’s drug problem. When disaggregated into its component parts, however, it is more 
revealing. Consider the following related estimates from that report, ONDCP (2004), each for the 
then most recent available year, 2002: 
  Of the $180.8 billion in illegal drug costs, $108 billion (nearly 60 percent) 
were crime-related (IV-7, V-2).  
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  Over two-thirds of those crime-related costs were in the form of lost 
productivity for those incarcerated on drug-related charges and costs 
related to the administration of the criminal justice system (IV-8). 
  Incarceration of offenders—475,000 for drug law violations, and 190,000 
for drug-related property or violent crimes—resulted in productivity losses 
of $39 billion and direct outlays of $17 billion at the federal, state and 
local levels (III-18, IV-8). 
  Health costs constituted a mere 8.7 percent of the total costs of drug abuse 
(vii).  
 
The ONDCP report goes on to state: 
[T]he large majority of these [crime] costs [of illegal drugs] are for drug specific 
offenses—sales, manufacturing, possession—and the smaller fraction are for 
drug-related crimes undertaken to finance expensive drug habits. Over 11 percent 
of arrests in the US are for drug offenses. In addition, appreciable fractions of 
income generating crimes are attributed to drug abuse: on the order of a quarter of 
burglaries, personal larcenies and robberies (xii). 
 
While steps toward legalization of currently illegal drugs would likely increase 
consumption, estimates vary about the extent of this change and how its concomitant costs would 
compare with gains from decreased law enforcement costs, productivity and other gains from 
reducing the levels of incarceration, and potentially substantial decreases in the crime and 
violence stemming from decreased profitability and scope of black markets.
40  Though our best 
guess is that moving towards legalization would substantially reduce crime, it is possible that a  
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regime shift to depenalization or legalization would increase toxicologically-induced crime and 
thereby offset expected decreases in black market crimes.
41 
Citing evidence that a high percentage of arrestees test positive for alcohol and various 
illegal drugs, advocates of continued criminalization frequently imply, contrary to the 
implications of the ONDCP cost study, that toxicologically induced crimes are more common or 
costly than those whose origins are systemic to drug prohibition. Data do show a correlation 
between crime and illicit drug use that is, upon first consideration, quite distressing: the 2008 
Annual Report of the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM II) found that in 2008, 
among ten major metropolitan areas across the country, the percentage of arrestees testing 
positive for the presence of some illicit substance ranged from 49 percent in Washington, D.C. to 
87 percent in Chicago (ONDCP 2009, 15). However, as we will reiterate in the sections that 
follow, extrapolating from the ADAM II results to a belief that drug criminalization decreases 
crime or violence (rather than substantially increases both) conflicts with a number of theoretical 
considerations as well as considerable empirical evidence concerning the relatively greater 
importance of systemic (compared to toxicologically motivated) offenses.  
Three theoretical points should be highlighted.  First, as previously noted, the 
approximately 1.8 million annual arrests for drug abuse violations are more than for any other 
category of offense (BJS 2009). It is neither surprising, nor indicative of a causal relationship 
between drug use and crime (other than the tautological one produced by criminalization itself) 
that individuals in this subcategory of arrestees frequently test positive for illegal drugs. Second, 
any causal extrapolation from the correlation between drug use and crime runs up against the 
intractable problem of omitted variables bias: it is quite likely that factors which predispose 
individuals to frequent use of drugs also push them toward both crime and greater likelihood of  
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apprehension by authorities. This is especially true for marijuana: detectable traces may remain 
in one’s system for extended periods of time, so one may test positive upon arrest even if the last 
instance of use occurred days or even weeks before the arrest, and before or after the commission 
of the offense (Pacula and Kilmer 2003). Third, the important question is not whether crime 
systemic to prohibition substantially outweighs toxicologically-induced crime—although, the 
best evidence supports this hypothesis. Rather, the appropriate inquiry should be into how the 
marginal decreases in systemic crime would compare to the marginal increases in 
toxicologically-driven crime given a regime change. Even if lesser penalties, depenalization or 
legalization would increase use, the new class of users—individuals formerly deterred by 
criminalization—would constitute a class much less predisposed to commit other crimes than the 
group of people already using under criminalization.  
Return to the ONDCP’s aggregate cost study and three of its key insights: (1) roughly 
forty percent of the current costs of illegal drugs in the United States are crime costs borne by 
offenders via incarceration and the government via administration of the criminal justice system; 
(2) these costs dominate the victim-borne costs of drug-related crime and health-related costs of 
abuse; and (3) the greatest driver of these costs is crime systemic to criminalization, rather than 
crime motivated by toxicology. Together, these propositions suggest that a substantial portion of 
America’s current drug problem is its drug control policy. Since government policies create 
some of the costliest of all the burdens associated with illegal drugs, a substantial reduction in 
the social costs of illegal drugs would seem to require a reduction in the costs imposed by the 
current criminalization regime, not just a restraint of the costs of abuse.  
 
III. Reforming America’s Illegal Drug Policy
42  
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a.  Broad Themes 
 
While many advocates of legalization and continued criminalization of illegal drugs see 
sufficient similarities across drug classes to paint with broad strokes, we perceive the nature and 
extent of the harms associated with each drug to call for careful, individualized analysis.
43 That 
is not to say that recreational drugs do not share certain similarities or that society’s experience 
with legal drugs cannot provide insight into the likely impact of legalizing a currently proscribed 
drug. The gaping disjunction between the law and policy toward cigarettes and alcohol on the 
one hand, and toward marijuana, cocaine and other currently illegal drugs on the other, appears 
less the result of thoughtful distinction than of inertia and a self-perpetuating myth that drugs 
accorded legal status are qualitatively similar to each other and different from drugs that are 
criminalized.
44 But if a unified approach across certain drugs might be desirable for a variety of 
reasons, only by meticulously examining each drug’s unique psychopharmacological effects and 
social attributes can we begin to group together the different drugs that should be treated 
similarly.
45 
In this section, we consider potential changes to America’s policy toward marijuana and 
cocaine. To oversimplify somewhat, marijuana is the most widely used illegal drug, one of the 
least dangerous for users across various dimensions, and the frequent subject of debate over 
policy reform. Likewise, any decrease in social costs stemming from a change to marijuana 
policy is likely to be far smaller than would result from a comparable policy change concerning a 
“harder” drug such as cocaine. On the other hand, because the social costs under America’s 
current drug regime are highest for cocaine,
46 changes to policy toward cocaine (as opposed to 
other narcotics) would change the social cost mitigation calculus in a way that would 
countenance potential risks and rewards of the greatest magnitude.   
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b.  Marijuana 
 
i.  Psychopharmacology and Culture 
[T]here is a glaring discontinuity between the lived experience of Americans and 
the drug policies of their governments. Nearly a hundred million of us—forty 
percent of the adult population, including pillars of the nation’s political, 
financial, academic, and media élites—have smoked (and, therefore, possessed) 
marijuana at some point, thereby committing an offense that, with a bit of bad 
luck, could have resulted in humiliation, the loss of benefits such as college loans 
and scholarships, or worse. More than forty thousand people are in jail for 
marijuana offenses, and some seven hundred thousand are arrested annually 
merely for possession. 
-Hendrik Hertzberg, Higher Standards, The New Yorker, February 25, 
2008. 
 
Marijuana is a pivotal substance in the debate over illegal drug policy for many reasons. 
The World Drug Report 2008 found that cannabis “continues to dominate the world’s illicit drug 
market in terms of pervasiveness of cultivation, volume of production and number of consumers 
. . . [and its consumer market] dwarfs those for other drugs” (UNODC 2008, 14). In its “Facts 
and Figures” webpage on Marijuana, the ONDCP highlights three statistics from the 2008 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) (SAMHSA 2009): among Americans aged 
12 or older, 102 million (over 40 percent) had tried marijuana in their lifetimes, 25.8 million 
(over 10 percent) had used in the past year and 15.2 million (over 6 percent) in the past month 
(ONDCP 2010). As noted in Figure 1, the United States is a clear outlier with respect to the  
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percentage of its population that has tried marijuana (though this is in part a reflection of the 
unusually high use rates in the late 1970s and 1980s). Although methodological issues and data 
availability make cross-country comparison for annual illegal drug use more difficult than for 
lifetime use, Figure 7 gives at least a crude sense of the United States in global context by 
showing the past year cannabis use estimates for the United States and the rest of North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and selected countries from western and central Europe.
47  The data 
suggest that America is also among the world leaders in the percentage of its population using 
marijuana more regularly. 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
Far more individuals are arrested for possession of marijuana in the United States than for 
any other illegal drug. Of the more than 1.8 million arrests for drug violations in 2007, 42.1 
percent—more than 750,000—were for marijuana possession, and when sales and possession 
arrests are aggregated, 47.4 percent or nearly half of all drug arrests are marijuana-related (FBI 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program 2007).
48 Marijuana arrests have risen significantly in recent 
decades; one recent study found that from 1992 to 2002 marijuana arrests increased by 113 
percent while overall arrests decreased by 3 percent (King and Mauer 2006).  
Room et al. (2008, 22) summarize the basic sensory effects of cannabis on its users: 
Cannabis produces euphoria and relaxation, alters perception, distorts time, and 
intensifies ordinary sensory experience, such as, eating, watching films, 
appreciating nature, and listening to music. Users’ short-term memory and 
attention, motor skills, reaction time and skilled activities are impaired while they 
are intoxicated…Cannabis users are typically seeking one or more of these effects  
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when they use. But use can also result in unsought and adverse effects. The most 
common unpleasant effects of acute cannabis use are anxiety and panic reactions  
. . . [these] are a common reason for discontinuing use. 
 
Current evidence suggests that while the harmful health effects of marijuana are not 
trivial (Browning 2009), they are less troublesome than those of other illegal drugs such as 
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. MacCoun and Reuter (2001, 356, 360) conclude that 
“[t]he harms of cannabis are clearly no greater that those of alcohol, at the individual level” and 
“dependence occurs frequently, almost as frequently as for alcohol amongst those who start 
using the drug. . . . [but with seemingly] modest adverse consequences.” A recent survey of 
clinicians and researchers found that the experts perceived cannabis to be less addictive than 
most other drugs—including caffeine, amphetamine, alcohol, cocaine, methamphetamine, 
oxycodone, crack, nicotine, and heroin (Gore and Earleywine 2007, 176-85).  Similarly, 
Kershaw and Cathcart (2009) report on a study by the Institute of Medicine which found that of 
those who tried tobacco, 32 percent went on to become dependent compared to just 9 percent for 
marijuana (see Figure 9).
49 Marijuana is also far less lethal than nicotine, alcohol, and other 
prevalent illegal drugs (Gable 2006, 155); fatal overdoses are unheard of, if not virtually 
impossible.  Long-term smoking of marijuana could generate adverse health consequences from 
breathing smoke, though increased potency reduces the number of inhalations required to 
achieve the desired effect. 
Marijuana use has intruded into mainstream America to a greater degree than any other 
illegal drug.
50  Moreover, Room et al. (2008) observe that because marijuana’s global prevalence 
so exceeds that of other illegal recreational drugs, the bureaucracies of drug control within 
individual countries and at the global level depend upon the criminalization of marijuana to  
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broaden the scope of their mission.  They note the World Drug Report 2008 estimates that 65 
percent of global seizures and 67 percent of “doses” seized were for cannabis and argue, using 
global use figures, that without cannabis illegal drug use would not be a global population-level 
issue (89, 92). Finally, the therapeutic potential of marijuana has given rise to a debate over 
whether doctors should be allowed to prescribe the drug for medicinal purposes.  
Perhaps for all these reasons, marijuana has proven an attractive target for advocates of 
legalization, though many prominent opponents endorse a continued hard-line stand.  Growing 
numbers of commentators in the popular press have advocated the legalization of marijuana 
(Klein 2009), and assessed the revenue boost legalization might provide states facing cash-
strapped budgets (Yamamuru 2009).   The debate has been further stimulated in recent months as 
states have begun reacting to Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement that the DEA will 
no longer raid state-approved medical marijuana distributors (Woo 2009).  
Willingness to consider—if not outright endorse—legalization of marijuana has also 
grown among academics. Over 500 economists,
51 including three Nobel Laureates,
52 signed an 
open letter to the President, Congress, Governors, and State Legislatures expressing skepticism 
about current marijuana policy and calling for open debate over a shift from prohibition to 
taxation and regulation. The letter highlights Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron’s 2005 report The 
Budgetary Implications of Marijuana Prohibition, which estimates that legalization would save 
the federal and state governments a combined $7.7 billion in prohibition enforcement 
expenditures and yield approximately $2.4 billion in tax revenues if taxed like an ordinary good 
or as much as $6.2 billion if taxed similarly to alcohol or tobacco (Miron 2005, 2-3).
53 In the 
wake of the recent economic downturn, old and new reformers have latched on to the “lost 
revenues” argument for legalization.  
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This section first considers the case for reforming marijuana policy, specifically weighing 
the costs of depenalization and legalization against those of the current system of prohibition.  
 
ii.  Criminalization 
A defense of marijuana prohibition based on cost-minimization analysis might proceed as 
follows. First, a completely unregulated market for marijuana would lead to undesirably high 
levels of consumption—either because of negative externalities (social costs of marijuana use 
that accrue to those not a party to marijuana use and exchange) or internalities (private costs that 
accrue to users themselves but that users nevertheless fail adequately to account for in their 
consumption decisions). Second, regulation and taxation will not adequately correct for these 
market failures. Third, severe criminal sanctions for users and sellers are cost-justified deterrence 
mechanisms for reducing use. A more sophisticated version of this third argument would make 
explicit an important hypothesis frequently left implicit but nevertheless underlying much 
thought about drug policy: criminalization may not only raise the price for the user (thereby 
reducing its attractiveness for an individual with given preferences) but also, through the norm-
generating or socializing effect of the law, actually alter individuals’ preferences such that for 
any given price, use and distribution hold less appeal.
54 
Though some libertarians argue that the value of individual autonomy dictates allowing 
marijuana use (irrespective of externalities) and simply sanctioning user behavior when it 
directly infringes upon the liberty of others, a cost-minimization approach demands 
consideration of the magnitude of social costs of use before accepting the notion that autonomy 
can trump all such social costs not generated directly from physical force or fraud.  Few dispute 
that marijuana creates at least some externalities and also internalities—certainly at least in the  
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case of minors not yet capable of adequately processing the risks but also perhaps for the 1 in 11 
who becomes dependent on the drug merely from trying it. The great contention is over which 
policies can most efficiently mitigate the total costs associated with marijuana use—in other 
words, which policies will yield the lowest total social costs, combining the costs of use and 
control. 
The crux of the argument in favor of retaining the prohibitions on use, possession, and 
sale of marijuana is that eliminating any of these sanctions would increase marijuana use by 
reducing the cost and decreasing the risk. Full legalization might also stimulate demand by 
enabling advertisement and brand development. Increased use—either in terms of intensity and 
frequency or number of users—would in turn increase the costs of use borne by users themselves 
and society. There are also two related, subsidiary arguments, worth addressing. First, it is often 
contended that marijuana is a “gateway drug” that renders its users more likely to begin using 
other, more dangerous drugs, and, therefore, an increase in marijuana users as a result of 
depenalization or legalization would in turn increase the number of users of other illegal drugs.
55 
Second, it is sometimes argued that marijuana use induces crime.    
Before turning in subsequent sections to the evidence regarding expected increases in 
marijuana use under depenalization and legalization, it is helpful to consider briefly the insightful 
analysis of the gateway issues offered by MacCoun and Reuter.  Though they believe that “there 
is little evidence that expanding marijuana use does increase the use of other, more harmful 
drugs,” MacCoun and Reuter present a taxonomy of seven possible meanings of the gateway 
concept: the first step; the spurious correlation; the early warning; the trap; the tantalizer; the toe 
in the water; and the foot in the door (MacCoun and Reuter 2001, 245-51).   
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The basic problems for an econometrician attempting to identify whether—and if so 
which—gateway hypotheses reflect actual experience are omitted variables bias and 
endogeneity. At the level of the individual, it is difficult to pinpoint a gateway mechanism 
because it is quite likely that underlying characteristics that predispose individuals to use 
marijuana also increase the likelihood of using other drugs. At the population level, it is difficult 
to assess the effect of marijuana use on the use of other drugs for an additional reason: causality 
likely runs in both directions.  
However, even without precisely estimating the impact of marijuana use on the 
likelihood of trying other drugs, one may place a rough upper bound on the extent of such an 
effect by noting how commonly individuals use marijuana without going on to other, more 
harmful drugs. In their recent cannabis report, Room et al. (2008, 65) write: “Few [marijuana 
users] go on to use more dangerous illicit drugs; the 1995 US National Household Survey on 
Drug Abuse found that only 23 percent of 26-34 year olds who had used marijuana at some time 
had also used cocaine during their lives.” Similarly, the 2007 NSDUH found that those who used 
marijuana exclusively constituted 53.3 percent of illegal drug users and 73.2 percent of 
marijuana users (SAMSHA 2008, 16).      
As MacCoun and Reuter remind us, it is also important to understand the mechanism of 
any gateway effect, assuming one exists at all. If the “gateway” is a matter of individuals 
becoming comfortable with illegal behavior and black market consumption, then legalization 
could undermine this gateway effect, even as it increased consumption directly via lower prices 
to users. 
The most-cited evidence in support of the hypothesis that marijuana users are driven to 
crime while under the influence is undoubtedly the ADAM II data indicating that in 8 of 10  
  35
major metropolitan areas studied in 2008, over 40 percent of arrestees tested positive for 
marijuana at the time of arrest (ONDCP 2009, 17). The weight of auxiliary evidence suggests, 
however, that this correlation primarily reflects factors other than a causal relationship of crime 
induction through intoxication.  
First, the psychopharmacological effects of marijuana are relatively modest compared to 
the effects of alcohol, cocaine, and other illegal drugs, and do not suggest, a priori, that 
intoxicated users are driven to violent, antisocial activity with great frequency.
 56  Second, it is 
clear from the sheer size of marijuana’s user base that most users do not resort to non-possessory 
crime at all—while intoxicated or otherwise. Third, some empirical evidence suggests that the 
enforcement of marijuana criminalization may not work even as a “broken windows” policing 
strategy,
57 much less as a direct measure preventing supposedly toxicologically induced crime. A 
recent analysis of marijuana in public view (MPV) arrests across 75 police precincts in New 
York City from 1989 to 2000 concluded that “there is no good evidence that this “reefer 
madness” policing strategy contributed to the decline in the sorts of serious crimes that are of 
greatest public concern in New York City” (Harcourt and Ludwig 2007, 166).
58 On the contrary: 
while an initial panel data analysis offered some support for the idea that these misdemeanor 
marijuana arrests contributed to reductions in violent crime, when the authors restructured their 
regression model to control for mean reversion, the coefficient on MPV arrests became 
statistically significant in the opposite direction—suggesting that “an increase in MPV arrests 
over the period translates into an increase in serious crime—not, as the broken windows theory 
would predict, a decrease in serious crime” (171). 
In considering the merits of criminalization, it is also important to remember that even 
within a system of criminalization, there is much leeway regarding the severity and nature of  
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prohibition enforcement. Moreover, there is significant historical and cross-country evidence to 
help understand how consumption and costs might change under a less punitive criminal regime. 
While it is always difficult to isolate the impact of a drug policy, and one must always be wary in 
generalizing from the experience of other countries to today’s America, there is evidence, albeit 
somewhat conflicting, suggesting that depenalization and even decriminalization of marijuana 
may not lead to significant increases in use.  
 
iii.  Depenalization 
It is often said that in the 1970s, eleven states “decriminalized” marijuana (NRC 2001). 
These states significantly reduced penalties for simple possession of marijuana, in some cases 
implementing a narrow form of the regime we call depenalization.
59 Evidence on the impact of 
these marijuana reform laws initially found little or only a weak effect (NRC 2001, 192-93).
60 
On the other hand, a recent study finds that because other states have also reduced penalties for 
marijuana possession, “[so called] decriminalized states are not uniquely identifiable based on 
statutory law as has been presumed by researchers over the past twenty years” (Pacula et al. 
2003, 26). The same study also finds, however, that the demand for marijuana among young 
people is sensitive to variation in penalties. A still more recent study traces the research—which 
began with studies finding little to no effect but now has become more mixed—and offers two 
possible explanations for the conflicting findings: (1) the effect of legal variation is different 
across age groups; and (2) the historical time period may matter (MacCoun et al. 2009, 350). 
Moreover, the authors find that a reason for minimal effects of depenalization may be that many 
individuals are unaware of the changes in their state’s marijuana law.
61   
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Another reason why use rates might not respond to decreased penalties is the extremely 
low likelihood of being arrested for illegal drug possession: reviewing the data, Boyum and 
Reuter estimate that in 1999, the “risk of being arrested for marijuana possession, conditional on 
using marijuana in the previous year, was about 3 percent; for cocaine the figure was 6 percent” 
(Boyum and Reuter 2005, 56). To the extent that individuals predisposed to illegal drug use also 
exhibit lower risk aversion and higher discounting of future welfare than the rest of society, they 
are especially unlikely to find psychologically salient—or change their behavior as a result of—
risks characterized by low probabilities and high costs, such as possible arrest for possession.  
Probably the most famous example of marijuana reform comes from the Netherlands. 
There, the 1976 “Opium Act” ushered in the de facto decriminalization (or extreme 
depenalization)
62 of possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal consumption (5 grams 
or fewer) and a system of tolerated sale in “coffee shops” that in some sense resembles a form of 
highly but peculiarly regulated legalization. Under the latter system, registered coffee shop 
owners that adhere to certain guidelines may, without being targeted for prosecution, possess up 
to 500 grams of cannabis and sell it in quantities of 5 grams or fewer (Abraham 1999, 1). The 
Dutch experience with this controlled form of drug use provides insight into what could happen 
if the United States were to move down a path toward depenalization, decriminalization, or even 
legalization of marijuana. MacCoun and Reuter (2005, 264) report that since the 1976 reform, 
the number of “coffee shops” has increased steadily so that there now may be between 1200 and 
1500 such venues in Amsterdam; on the other hand, van der Gouwe, Ehrlich, and van Laar 
(2009) report a decrease in the number of officially tolerated coffee shops from 1999 to 2007.  
Marijuana use in the Netherlands increased during the 1980s and early 1990s as the “coffee 
shops” became more widespread.  However, there is no evidence for the existence of the so- 
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called “gateway effect” discussed earlier. Notably, there was no increase in use rates of heroin, 
which is traditionally the most widely used hard drug in the Netherlands, or of cocaine, in spite 
of the corresponding crack crisis in the United States (MacCoun and Reuter 2005, 264).  Indeed, 
the European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs (ESSPAOD 2003) conducted a 
quarter-century after de facto decriminalization and emergence of the coffee shop system in the 
Netherlands found that only 28 percent of Dutch school children surveyed reported smoking 
cannabis compared with 38 percent in France, whose politicians have been harshly critical of the 
Dutch approach.
63  Also, as we note in Figure 1 below, data from the World Health Organization 
World Mental Health Surveys indicate that when measured in terms of lifetime cannabis use, the 
United States has a much higher rate of those over age 18 who have ever used cannabis (42 
percent) compared with the Netherlands (20 percent) (Degenhardt et al. 2008, 1057).   
One of the goals of the Dutch scheme involves separating cannabis sales from sales of 
other illicit drugs in the hopes that cannabis users will not come into contact with sellers of drugs 
like heroin, thus stopping marijuana users from moving to more serious drugs.  Manja Abraham 
(1999) reported that for users over age 18, 48 percent of cannabis purchases took place in coffee 
shops, whereas relatives and friends supplied 39 percent of cannabis used (3-4).  While this 
demonstrates that a large informal cannabis market exists, only 3.7 percent of users reported 
obtaining cannabis from a stranger and 5 percent from a home dealer, someone who advertises 
cannabis sales and delivers them to the home, legally or illegally, depending upon the amount 
delivered.   Among experienced users of cannabis (those who report using the drug more than 25 
times in their lives), 54 percent reported purchasing cannabis most often in a coffee shop 
compared with 32 percent for less-experienced users (Abraham 1999, 4). This suggests that 
while a large percentage of sales occur outside of the state-sanctioned coffee shops, the heaviest  
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users obtain their cannabis through regulated channels or from people they know, rather than 
participating in a clandestine market of dealers.  The lack of transactions with dealers who are 
otherwise unrelated to the individual is important because it is such transactions that bring an 
individual into contact with the black market and its associated crime and violence. 
Evidence from Portugal and Australia also suggests that depenalization need not lead to 
substantial increases in marijuana use or its associated problems. In the period since 
decriminalization, drug use in Portugal has not spiked, nor has the country been besieged by drug 
tourists (Cato Institute 2009).  In fact, Portugal continues to have among the lowest rates of 
cannabis and cocaine use in the European Union, and its rates remain far below their 
counterparts in the United States (Greenwald 2009, 23-24).  Room et al. (2008, 130-33) have 
pulled together a handful of studies comparing changes in use rates in Australian jurisdictions 
covered by schemes involving civil penalties for small cannabis offenses with changes in use 
rates for the rest of Australia still subject to the country’s standard criminal penalties for 
marijuana possession. On the whole, these analyses offer little if any evidence to suggest that use 
rates increased more in civil penalty jurisdictions than elsewhere. 
In the United States, medical marijuana laws have begun to create a subsystem that, 
under our taxonomy, would be considered a form of decriminalization verging on a highly 
regulated form of legalization. Medical marijuana laws have introduced a mechanism that allows 
patients to grow and use marijuana for medical purposes without facing the prospect of state 
prosecution, while still allowing the states and the federal government to continue prohibiting the 
large-scale cultivation, distribution, and ordinary possession of marijuana.  Fifteen U.S. states 
have provisions allowing for some type of medical marijuana; however, these subsystems of 
decriminalization differ from state to state.  For example, in Colorado, a constitutional  
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amendment providing for medical marijuana included the requirement that patients using 
medical marijuana possess a registry identification card issued by the state, and it provided for 
the establishment of a confidential state registry for this purpose.
64  In California, probably the 
best-known example of a medical marijuana regime in the United States, the Compassionate Use 
Act of 1996 simply declares as one of its purposes: “to ensure that patients and their primary 
caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a 
physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.”
65  This act did not create a 
mandatory registry program for patients using medical marijuana.  Rather, in 2004, California 
introduced a voluntary Medical Marijuana ID card, administered by the county governments.
66   
While California’s medical marijuana dispensaries have been the focus of several news 
stories since the Obama Administration announced that agencies in charge of enforcing federal 
drug laws would no longer raid such dispensaries (Johnson 2009), the legal status of dispensaries 
remains questionable, and it would be misleading simply to say that California legalized the 
“sale” of medical marijuana (Wohlsen and Risling 2009; Martin and del Barco 2009).  The 
Compassionate Use Act did not provide for sales through such dispensaries, and the expanded 
codification of medical marijuana in California occurring in 2003 provided only for multiparty 
growing of marijuana in collectives and cooperatives.
67  California’s Attorney General has 
indicated that for dispensaries to operate legally in California, they must operate as a non-profit, 
only sell to members of the collective, verify members’ status as qualified patients or primary 
caregivers, only acquire marijuana from qualified members, and only cultivate and transport 
amounts required to meet the needs of the collective’s members (State of California 2008).   
The California courts have also placed limits on the ability of individuals cultivating and 
selling marijuana to avoid prosecution for possession and sale of the drug by claiming to be the  
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“primary caregiver” of multiple patients.  The California Supreme Court has held that a patient’s 
primary caregiver must establish such status “based on evidence independent of the 
administration of medical marijuana,” and that growth and supply of medical marijuana alone are 
insufficient to establish oneself as a primary caregiver.
68  The California Supreme Court has also 
held that employers can fire medical marijuana patients who test positive for marijuana as a 
result of a urinalysis, because the drug remains illegal at the federal level, and nothing prevents 
employers from terminating employees who use illegal substances.
69  Thus, while medical 
marijuana states like California have decriminalized marijuana possession and use for medical 
marijuana patients, users still face repercussions such as loss of employment and certain 
limitations on purchases of marijuana that would presumably be reduced or eliminated in a 
legalization regime.  
   
iv.  Legalization 
From a cost-minimization perspective, the primary expected benefits of legalization over 
depenalization would be even more substantial reductions in government expenditures on drug 
control, new tax revenues to offset remaining government spending, the potential for increased 
government control over product standards and labeling information, and substantial reductions 
in drug-related crime costs. Government regulation of labeling and product standards could help 
mitigate the problems of increased potency and user uncertainty regarding whether the drug 
taken has been laced with, or partly replaced by, other harmful ingredients the consumer did not 
intend to use—such as PCP. As noted earlier, Miron (2005, 2-3) estimates that the tax revenues 
from legalized marijuana would indeed be substantial—somewhere between $2.4 and $6.2 
billion.
70 By undermining the black market, marijuana legalization could also be expected to  
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reduce systemic or economically motivated marijuana-related crime (as opposed to any 
toxicologically motivated marijuana crime), and the costs of law enforcement efforts targeted at 
marijuana. Miron (2005, 2) also estimates that legalization would save the federal and state 
governments a combined $7.7 billion in prohibition enforcement expenditures. While the 
assumptions required for such estimates make them imprecise, it is not implausible that for 
marijuana alone, the combination of tax revenues and diminished enforcement expenditures 
could boost government coffers by over $10 billion. 
However, given the extremely large number of arrests for marijuana possession—far 
more than for sale—depenalization could achieve many of the same gains in reduced 
enforcement costs. Moreover, marijuana often has a much shorter distribution chain than 
cocaine; cultivation by individuals is common and many users receive marijuana from friends for 
free.
71 These social factors may help explain why violence appears to be significantly less 
common and severe in black markets for marijuana than in such markets for cocaine.
72 Hence, 
one of legalization’s advantages over depenalization—its ability to undermine black markets—
may be less important for marijuana than for cocaine.  Legalization could also be expected to 
increase use more substantially than depenalization, although social costs of additional marijuana 
use could be mitigated if marijuana proved a partial substitute—rather than complement—for 
such drugs as cigarettes and alcohol.   
We next consider additional considerations relevant to legalization:  advertising, 
international legal obligations, and informational benefits.   
Advertising. Legalization of marijuana in the United States might unleash the power of 
American advertising to entice consumers to use newly legalized substances while obscuring 
their dangers.  There is some chance that an outright interdiction on advertisements of legalized  
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drugs would be found to violate First Amendment speech protections.  Twenty-five years ago, 
the Supreme Court held in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company
73 that if the 
government can ban a product or an activity like gambling, it can also proscribe advertising of 
that product or activity. This might suggest that because marijuana and other drugs are currently 
prohibited, advertising of such products could be banned.  More recent decisions, however, have 
suggested that the government is not necessarily empowered to ban truthful advertising, even of 
products it could otherwise proscribe.
74   
Steven Duke and Albert Gross (2006, 214-16) have called the Posadas decision an 
“aberration” and suggested that a complete ban on drug advertising could chill debate about the 
true dangers of drug use.  Instead, these authors argue that a better way to limit advertising 
would be to withhold trademark protection from companies selling legalized drugs so that they 
would have no brand names to advertise, unlike today’s alcohol and cigarette companies.  In 
addition, Duke and Gross recommend placing warnings on print ads at least as large as the 
largest type in the ads and prohibiting radio and television advertising, which the Court has held 
to be immune from First Amendment protections because the airwaves are owned by the 
public.
75  
Evidence on the value of warning labels comes from Canada where colorful pictures of 
the damage to the body associated with smoking are placed on cigarette packages and required to 
cover at least 30 percent of the package material.  The Canadian warnings have been found to be 
far more effective at inhibiting smoking than the bland American “Surgeon General’s Warning” 
(Givel 2007).  One of the most touted anti-drug advertising campaigns in the United States has 
been Montana’s attempt to counter its methamphetamine problem through television ads and 
billboards depicting the physical deformities and violent behavior caused by meth use.   
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According to one analysis, two years after the introduction of the “Not Even Once” advertising 
campaign, meth use in Montana had dropped by one-half (Beale 2008).  Following legalization, 
rigorous requirements on packaging of newly legalized drugs and explicit counter advertisements 
could help reduce a sudden surge in demand.   
Placing such explicit warnings on newly legalized drug products would raise questions 
about how to deal with alcohol and tobacco advertising following the legalization of currently 
illicit substances.  If one were to enact strict regulations requiring graphic depictions of the 
harms of newly legalized drugs like marijuana, it would seem inconsistent to allow cigarette 
manufacturers to continue packaging cigarettes with the current Surgeon General’s Warning, 
given that in terms of both lethality and addictiveness, marijuana may well be a less dangerous 
substance than nicotine (Gable 2006, 153).  A comprehensive marketing policy on all dangerous 
substances might be difficult to accomplish, however, for political reasons. 
An ongoing case filed in federal district court in Kentucky by several tobacco 
manufacturers and retailers could determine the extent to which the government may require 
large or graphic warning labels in print advertisements or product packaging.
76  In this case, the 
plaintiffs are seeking an injunction against sections of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act
77 requiring graphic warning labels on cigarette packaging similar to those 
found in Canada, curtailing the use of color advertising in magazines with over 15 percent 
readership or two million readers under age 18, and prohibiting the advertisement of tobacco 
products within 1,000 feet of school playgrounds.  In January 2010, the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Kentucky granted the plaintiff tobacco companies’ motion for summary 
judgment regarding the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act’s provision 
requiring that all tobacco advertising appear in black text on a white background in magazines  
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with over 15 percent readership or two million readers under the age of 18.
78  The court found 
that the ban violated the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve the 
asserted state interest of protecting minors from tobacco advertising.  The court seemed to place 
heavy emphasis on the fact that barring all color advertising would ban some of the logos and 
product symbols used by tobacco companies; product symbols whose meanings could not easily 
be translated into black and white text.
79  However, the court was more tolerant of the new 
warning requirements that mandate that cigarette packaging contain graphic warnings similar to 
those used in Canada, finding that these restrictions were narrowly tailored, and thus not in 
violation of the First Amendment.
80 This case will likely be appealed, and if it reaches the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which many experts believe it will, its holding could shape the government’s 
ability to restrict the advertisement of legalized drugs for decades to come. 
International Law. Another complication for legalization is international law.  While 
many researchers attempt to make international comparisons in studying drugs, one area of drug 
control policy that receives scant attention is the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 which binds all UN member nations to maintain prohibition of drugs, including 
cannabis specifically (Levine and Reinarman 2006, 61). While the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs requires that countries maintain prohibition of manufacture, sales, and import, it 
does not require a punitive regime of the type currently found in the United States.  Article 36 of 
the Single Convention, “Penal Provision,” specifically allows for treatment programs to either 
enhance or serve as a substitute for punishment.
81  The Economist reports that countries like the 
Netherlands are able to allow for some innovation in controlling marijuana use through the 
convention’s commentary, which states that its goal is “improvement of the efficacy of national 
criminal justice systems in the field of drug trafficking” (A Toker’s Guide 2009).  Thus reforms  
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working within the framework of the existing treaty are possible, though full-scale legalization 
would require either a country’s withdrawal from the treaty or revision thereof.  
Perhaps partly due to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, even countries with more 
liberal narcotics policies than the United States lack full-fledged drug legalization and at most 
allow for depenalization of marijuana and/or widespread needle exchange programs.  As 
discussed above, in the Netherlands, a country long known for its tolerance of marijuana 
smoking, the importation and commercial production of cannabis remains illegal (Levine and 
Reinarman 2006, 64).  When considering its own drug reform, Portugal declined to adopt 
outright legalization likely in part because of its treaty obligations under the 1961 Single 
Convention (Cato Institute 2009). 
Information Under Legalization.  America’s war on drugs is deeply entrenched, and 
powerful institutional forces make change difficult. In important ways the case for marijuana 
reform rests not only on the potential for the institution of an evidence-based, cost-minimizing 
approach to marijuana policy in its own right, but also on the possibility that marijuana reform 
might catalyze the use of such an approach in shaping drug policy in general. The National 
Research Council’s Informing America’s Policy on Illegal Drugs: What We Don’t Know Keeps 
Hurting Us argued that our current form of criminalization severely limits the tools social 
science needs to study the effects of drugs and drug policies, and it therefore poses a serious 
obstacle for the possibility of making policy based on sound evidence. Criminalization obscures 
our knowledge of consumption patterns, prices, and potencies, and hence of the responsiveness 
of prices to policy changes.
82 Perhaps most significantly, because America has no recent 
experience with the legalization of major currently illegal drugs, there has been too little 
variation in the data to tease out the causal effects of prohibition or the likely consequences of its  
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repeal.
83 Policy changes resulting in interstate variation in the treatment of marijuana would 
generate clearer information for analysts and policymakers. 
 
c.  Cocaine 
 
Cocaine has made America’s drug problem uniquely severe and has been at the heart of 
such national policies as President Reagan’s push for an increasingly punitive war on drugs in 
the 1980s and Plan Colombia in the 1990s.  As already noted, the United States is an outlier in 
cocaine use in terms of the percentage of Americans having ever tried the substance, which is 
approximately four times that of the next highest use country included in a 2008 World Health 
Organization survey of international drug use, as seen in Figure 2. Data from the 2009 World 
Drug Report, which compiles recent annual use figures from several dozen countries, indicate 
that in terms of current use rates the U.S. is no longer such an outlier.  Nonetheless, Figure 8 
below shows America’s past-year prevalence rate is still among the highest in the world. 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
In order to better recognize the unique attributes of cocaine, we begin by offering a 
review of the psychopharmacology of the drug and then move into analyses of the problems with 
mandatory minimum sentencing and differences between the U.S. approach and that of other 
countries. 
 
i.  Psychopharmacology and Systemic Crime 
Much of America’s strict prohibition on cocaine is premised on the belief that cocaine is 
far more damaging psycho-pharmacologically than other licit or illicit drugs.  Regular cocaine 
use does lead to unquestionable medical and psychological problems.  Cocaine is a stimulant,  
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meaning that it causes the body to “speed up” the operation of ordinary functions.  At low doses, 
physical effects of cocaine are similar to those of high doses of caffeine, including “nervousness, 
jitteriness, sleeplessness and agitation,” whereas high doses of cocaine can result in “suspicion, 
hypervigilance, and paranoia,” and extremely high doses can result in “a toxic psychosis, with 
symptoms similar to the delirium of high fever” (Morgan and Zimmer 1997, 137). As evidenced 
by the death of “body packers” who swallow balloons filled with cocaine in order to transport the 
substance into the United States, cocaine can be deadly if consumed in large doses (137-38).   
Though by nearly all accounts cocaine is more harmful to its users than marijuana, the 
belief that cocaine is not at all comparable to alcohol or nicotine is undermined by studies on 
lethality and addictiveness of common drugs.  Using a “safety ratio” measure calculated by 
taking the “lethal dose” of a drug (the quantity which causes death in 50 percent of animals) and 
dividing it by the “effective dose” (the quantity necessary to produce the desired effect in 50 
percent of animal populations), cocaine has a higher ratio (15) than ethanol (10), indicating that 
it carries less risk of accidental fatal overdose than alcohol (Gable 2006, 153).    
As for the likelihood that one will become addicted to cocaine, sometimes called the 
“capture ratio,” a 1999 study by The Institute of Medicine found that only 17 percent of those 
who try cocaine go on to become dependent on the substance, whereas the same figure is 32 
percent for tobacco users as shown in Figure 9 below (Kershaw and Cathcart 2009).  This 
finding comports with the latest Monitoring the Future study finding that while 7.2 percent of 
high school seniors report having used cocaine at least once in their lifetime, only 1.9 percent 
report having used cocaine in the past 30 days (NIDA 2009, 192, 199).  This suggests that a large 
portion of those who try cocaine do not become regular users.  A comparison with tobacco 
proves illustrative, because while 44.7 percent of high school students report having used  
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tobacco at least once during their lifetimes, 20.4 percent report having used the substance in the 
past 30 days, suggesting that, at least given current law, tobacco has a higher addiction rate than 
cocaine (192, 199).  This evidence tends to undermine the view that anyone trying cocaine will 
all but certainly become an addict.  
Insert Figure 9 about here 
U.S. drug policy has also reflected exaggeration of differences between the 
psychopharmacological effects of cocaine and crack.  The primary difference between cocaine 
and crack use stems from the differing routes of administration, with powder cocaine being 
snorted through the nose, while crack cocaine is generally smoked.  Smoking crack leads to a 
quicker high than snorting powder cocaine because the large surface area of the lungs and the 
proximity of pulmonary to cerebral circulation allow for rapid absorption of the drug and a direct 
route to the brain (Belenko 1993, 34-35).  This rapid absorption results in a high within 5-10 
seconds and a subsequent crash once the high wears off (35).  Physically, crack smoking, like 
smoking of other drugs, can lead to a variety of lung problems.
84  Behaviorally, crack smoking is 
associated with many of the same problems observed in users of powder cocaine, including 
depression, loss of interest, nervousness, fatigue, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and thoughts of 
suicide, though with higher prevalence than for powder cocaine users (38).  However, these 
behavioral problems are gathered from surveys of crack users, and thus come from a self-
selected population that may be predisposed to such disorders even without drug use (38).   
While differences do exist between cocaine and crack, many of the policy changes, such 
as the much harsher federal sentencing guidelines for crack as opposed to powder cocaine, now 
appear to have been enacted partly because of an exaggeration of the differences between the 
effects of cocaine and crack. Consider, for example, the “crack baby” scare of the 1980s, during  
  50
which the media highlighted the problem of numerous babies supposedly born addicted to crack.   
This scare appears to have been sensationalized.  Recent research calls into question the 
supposed link between mothers using crack and children suffering from physical ailments 
different from those experienced by children whose mothers are not crack users (Morgan and 
Zimmer 1997, 152-54).  Apparently, many of the problems associated with “crack babies” can be 
traced to the strong correlation between using crack and the failure of mothers to take other steps 
associated with prenatal health rather than physiological effects of crack use on the infants.   
Psychopharmacological effects have been mischaracterized in other ways as well, 
beginning with the nature of the relationship between crack use and crime. Many people believe 
that crack causes crime because of its physical effects on the user.  However, while crack was 
associated with a large increase in violence in American cities during the late 1980s, the 
psychopharmacological impact of the drug was largely not to blame.  In a study of New York 
City murders committed during a six month period of 1988—the height of the crack epidemic—
researchers attempted to attribute the cause of homicides to three different drug-related factors: 
(a) psychopharmacological effects of drug use, (b) economic compulsion in which drug addicts 
kill while committing thefts to fund drug purchases, and (c) systemic effects of participating in 
the drug market, such as when a dealer kills one of his own agents (Goldstein et al. 1997, 117).  
These researchers determined that only 7.5 and 1.9 percent of the murders could be attributed 
solely to either the psychopharmacological effects of drug use or economic compulsion, 
respectively, (another 4.1 percent fell into multiple categories) whereas 39.1 percent were part of 
the systemic involvement in the illegal drug markets.
 85  This study found that 52.6 percent of 
homicides in New York City during this peak period of the crack problem were in some way 
drug related. Nonetheless, the psychopharmacological effects of drugs do not appear to be the  
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primary culprit in the correlation between homicide and crack use.  This is underscored by the 
substantial crime and homicide drops in the 1990s, which, as Figure 7 reveals, occurred even as 
the percentage of 12
th graders reporting cocaine use in the past month rose through the decade, 
following a substantial decline in the late 1980s. 
In other words, it appears more the clandestine nature of the market in which cocaine is 
traded rather than the drug itself that leads to violent crime.  When two drug dealers or a drug 
dealer and customer have a dispute regarding a sale or drug turf, they cannot use the legal system 
to settle the dispute. Rather, they must work problems out on their own, often through violent 
means. 
In a 1999 article, Miron contributed an analysis supportive of the systemic violence view 
based on national time series data through 1995. The data showed a positive correlation between 
an index of prohibition expenditures and the homicide rate that was statistically significant 
across several specifications and persisted even with controls for demographic variables, the 
unemployment rate, per capita income, the execution rate and the incarceration rate (Miron 
1999). The intuitive causal theory offered by Miron and others is that the more severe the 
prohibition on illegal drugs, the more attractive is violence relative to other mechanisms of 
dispute resolution and the greater is the diversion of law enforcement resources from other 
crimes.  Notably, the relationship Miron identified in the data extended beyond the end of 
Prohibition in 1933—which, as we noted earlier, ushered in a major decrease in homicide (and 
crime, even in the midst of the Great Depression).  Examining Figure 10, our simple plot of 
Miron’s prohibition enforcement index against the homicide rate, one sees that his national time 
series correlation appears strong up to the early 1990s (when Miron’s original data set ended), 
after which time the story breaks down.  
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Insert Figure 10 about here 
With more recent data provided to us by Miron and Angela Dills, his coauthor on a more 
recent paper again using national time series data to analyze the effect of a variety of variables 
on various measures of crime (Dills, Miron, and Summers 2008),
86 we revisited Miron’s original 
hypothesis and regression specifications. We extended one of Miron’s original regressions and 
several slight variations on that specification to nearly an additional decade of time and two 
subsets of the available data—1933-2004 and 1966-2004.
87  The regression from 1933 onward 
tested the sensitivity of the drug prohibition spending coefficient to the exclusion of early 20
th 
century data, the accuracy of which is questionable and upon which at least one econometrician 
has attempted to improve (Eckberg 1995).
88  The regression from 1966 onward tested whether 
the positive correlation between prohibition enforcement spending and the homicide rate held up 
for the last third of the 20
th century onward—the time period over which substantial anti-drug 
spending emerged and the war on drugs became entrenched.
89  
Finally, we conducted one additional set of regressions (which we do not report here) as a 
modest check on how well Miron’s prohibition enforcement index proxies for overall spending 
on drug criminalization. Miron’s index tracks the population- and inflation-adjusted expenditures 
by the one or two federal laws or agencies at any given time devoted exclusively to drug and/or 
alcohol prohibition, which have at many times been a relatively small component of total anti-
drug spending.
90 While the current state of available data makes it infeasible to incorporate state-
level enforcement spending (which has been estimated to exceed federal spending and the 
absence of which is a shortcoming of Miron’s approach),
91 we were able to test Miron’s 
prohibition enforcement index as a proxy for overall domestic law enforcement spending by 
running simple, uncontrolled regressions for 1986 through 2001 using total federal domestic law  
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enforcement (population- and inflation-adjusted analogously to Miron’s index), after which time 
the ONDCP’s computation methodology radically changed (ONDCP 2002, 10-11; ONDCP 
1998, 16). While the short time span is a concern, the general consistency of the results using the 
two different measures suggests that Miron’s index offers a reasonable approximation of changes 
to at least federal domestic enforcement spending.         
The first two columns of Table 1 show Miron’s original specifications through 1995 and 
the resulting positive coefficient on his drug prohibition spending index, which was significant at 
the 1 percent level.  Our effort at reproducing Miron’s original demographics-controlled 
regression also reveals a positive coefficient, albeit smaller and significant only at the 5 percent 
level.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
When one extends the data beyond 1995, however, the relationship that Miron had 
established for the previous 95 years appears to break down.  In our regressions on the homicide 
rate through 2004, starting in 1900 (with and without Eckberg’s adjusted pre-1933 homicide 
rate), 1933 and 1966, the coefficient on the prohibition spending index is generally smaller and 
only for 1966 onward does Miron’s full specification yield a coefficient on the prohibition 
spending index that is significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the R-squared values for the 
regressions from 1990 to 2004 are much lower than those for Miron’s original regressions from 
1900 to 1995. 
  The regression results do not fatally undermine the hypothesis that drug criminalization 
increases the homicide rate. They do, however, cast further doubt on the strength of empirical 
support (which was already only speculative and provisional) for Miron’s intuitively plausible 
theory. Figure 10 reveals why the added data from the 1990s onward weakens the estimated  
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relationship between prohibition enforcement expenditures and homicide:  federal per capita 
drug prohibition spending has continued to rise despite a steady fall in the homicide rate. 
  A number of more general problems potentially plague the basic regression 
specifications:  the enormous difficulty of drawing causal inferences from national time series 
data; the possibility that causality runs in both directions; and the omission of state enforcement 
expenditures and other possible explanatory factors. However, bearing in mind these various 
provisos, Miron’s analysis is consistent with, and provides a notable (though tentative and 
limited) supplement to, more targeted analyses—such as the aforementioned study of New York 
murders—supporting the theory that criminalization does more harm by the systemic crime and 
violence it creates than good in any toxicologically-induced crime it may prevent. 
 
ii.  Costs of Incarceration 
The criminalization of cocaine has greatly contributed to our country’s vast prison 
population.  Related problems with our current approach to cocaine are mandatory minimum 
sentences and the differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine.  As discussed earlier, there 
is a large racial disparity between African-Americans and Caucasians in terms of the percentage 
imprisoned for drug-related offenses. Much of this racial disparity is the result of mandatory 
sentences for possession and trafficking of crack which have been far more severe than those in 
place for powder cocaine.  In the early 1990s, over 90 percent of defendants in crack cases were 
African-American compared with only 25 percent of defendants in powder cocaine cases 
(Caulkins et al. 1997, 20).
92  Mandatory sentencing laws for drugs generally prescribe a sentence 
based on the quantity of the drug in question.  Until just recently, under federal sentencing 
guidelines a defendant needed to possess an amount of powder cocaine one hundred times  
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greater than the amount of crack cocaine in order to receive an equivalent sentence.
93  Thus a 
defendant convicted of possessing 50 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute faced a 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years whereas a defendant would need to possess 5 
kilograms of powder cocaine to expect the same sentence.   
Though President Obama recently signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which is set to reduce 
the sentencing disparity ratio from to 100 to 1 to 18 to 1 (CNN Wire Staff 2010), a significant 
differential will remain, and some states also have adopted more stringent sentences for crack 
cocaine than powder cocaine (Boyum and Reuter 2005, 52).  Differences in state law treatment 
of the two drugs have the potential to be more important because more prisoners are convicted of 
crack offenses at the state rather than federal level each year.    
In addition to the racial disparities created by mandatory sentencing laws, scholars have 
also noted additional concerns regarding their implementation.  First among these is the fact that 
drug amounts are determined by mixture weight rather than pure weight.   This introduces 
sentencing distortion because drugs sold in the illicit market vary greatly in their purity.  For 
example, the sale of coca leaf, which contains only 2 percent cocaine, is treated the same as the 
sale of pure powder cocaine in terms of weight, even though 100 grams of coca leaf has the same 
amount of cocaine as 2 grams of pure cocaine (Caulkins et al. 1997, 23). The focus on weight 
also prevents a distinction between large-scale dealers, the “kingpins” of the business, and small 
time dealers.  A “kingpin” may operate in such a way that he carries very little of a drug 
substance on him at any given time and thus when caught in possession with an intent to sell, 
receives a lighter sentence than one of his subordinates, who carries larger quantities of the 
substance in order to make frequent sales.  Without the mandatory minimum sentences, judges 
would have more discretion to differentiate between the “kingpin” and the small-time dealer.    
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Mandatory sentences shift power from judges to prosecutors because prosecutors have 
discretion concerning whether to charge an individual with a crime carrying a given minimum 
sentence, whereas once the defendant is convicted, under a mandatory sentencing scheme the 
judge lacks the discretion to reduce a sentence (Caulkins et al. 1997, 24).  Deciding whether it is 
preferable to grant more power to judges or prosecutors is a judgment call which depends on 
whether one believes such power should be vested in the executive or judicial branch; however, 
the shift in power is a clear impact of mandatory minimum sentencing laws.     
Given the substantial costs of mandatory minimums, are they necessary or cost-justified 
deterrence mechanisms?  Credible evidence suggests they are not.  A 1997 empirical evaluation 
of the cost-effectiveness of mandatory drug sentences found mandatory minimums are less 
effective at reducing cocaine use than both conventional enforcement and treatment programs 
(Caulkins et al. 1997).  The authors, part of the RAND Drug Policy Research Center, attempted 
to measure the effects on cocaine consumption of spending an additional $1 million on 
conventional enforcement, mandatory minimum sentences, or treatment.  Looking at the 184,548 
drug dealers convicted in state and federal courts during 1990, the authors estimated that were 
the federal mandatory minimum drug sentences
94 applied to all of these dealers, the cost to the 
public for the additional prison time would be $22.5 billion.  According to the model tested in 
this study, longer sentences influence cocaine consumption by raising the price of cocaine as 
dealers increase prices in order to offset the increased probability of a longer prison sentence.  
Using an estimate that a drug dealer must be compensated an additional $37,500 per additional 
year of incarceration and a cost to the public of $25,000 per year of incarceration, they estimated 
that each $1 spent on longer sentences will translate into a $1.50 increase in total costs to 
consumers of cocaine.  Thus they found that an additional $1 million spent on longer sentences  
  57
would increase cocaine prices by 0.004 percent.
95  Over a 15 year time horizon given a dealer 
discount rate of 12 percent and an elasticity of demand for cocaine of 1, they determined that 
each additional $1 million spent on longer sentences reduces cocaine consumption by 12.6 
kilograms nationwide (Caulkins et al. 1997, 103).  Given estimated total annual consumption of 
291,000 kilograms, this represents a change far less than one-hundredth of one percent.  If one 
assumes the relationship to be linear over this range, every increase in incarceration costs of $1 
billion per year might be expected to reduce cocaine consumption by about 4.3 percent.   
When evaluating treatment programs, the RAND authors relied on Rydell’s and 
Everingham’s (1994) study of cocaine treatment reporting that 13 percent of cocaine addicts 
abstain from hardcore cocaine use in the long-run following treatment and that 79 percent abstain 
during the 0.3 year length of the average treatment program.  Given the $1,740 average cost of a 
treatment program, an extra $1 million could treat 575 heavy cocaine users, resulting in a 16 
kilogram reduction in the first year.  Over a 15 year time horizon, given that 13 percent of heavy 
users quit heavy use following treatment, these authors estimated that each $1 million spent on 
treatment would reduce cocaine consumption by 103.6 kilograms, compared with 12.6 kilograms 
for longer sentences, making treatment appear much more effective (Caulkins et al. 1997, 105).  
While the linearity assumption might be more strained over this range, the comparison to the 
incarceration-increase numbers is revealing:  an annual increase of $1 billion in spending on 
treatment might be expected to reduce cocaine consumption by 35.6 per cent. 
These findings are in line with Rydell’s and Everingham’s (1994) examination of the 
effectiveness of treatment (both outpatient and residential programs) compared with three other 
drug enforcement policies:  source country control (eradicating coca leaves in the country where 
they are grown), interdiction (seizures at the U.S. border to prevent cocaine from entering the  
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country) and domestic enforcement (cocaine seizures, asset seizures, and arrests of drug dealers 
by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies). The authors found that the cost of crime 
and productivity loss from cocaine use decreases by $7.46 for every $1 spent on treatment 
whereas the same figure for source country control is $0.15 per dollar, $0.32 for interdiction, and 
$0.52 for domestic enforcement.  Rydell’s & Everingham’s initial study was criticized for 
underestimating the decrease in cocaine use stemming from increases in cocaine prices due to 
source-country control, interdiction, and domestic enforcement.  Repeating their study of policy 
effectiveness in 2000 assuming a more elastic demand for cocaine, Caulkins, Chiesa, and 
Everingham (2000) determined that treatment has a four-to-one advantage over domestic 
enforcement in reducing the costs of crime and productivity losses. 
Overall, this evidence on treatment versus severe punishment for those found possessing 
or dealing cocaine today suggests that mandatory treatment for drug offenders is a more cost-
effective solution. As with marijuana policy, there appear to be many potential improvements for 
cocaine policy, even within the regime of criminalization. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In the United States—indeed, throughout the world—many individuals are drawn to 
substances that may harm them greatly.  Public policy varies enormously with respect to these 
substances, partly based on the degree of addiction, the nature of harms, and historical 
experience.   Though sugar, saturated fat, and high fructose corn syrup impose enormous health 
costs, regulation to discourage consumption of them is virtually non-existent; in fact, corn 
subsidies in particular have been criticized for perversely incentivizing poor diets. In contrast, 
tobacco and alcohol are subject to considerable regulation while remaining legal, and a host of  
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drugs ranging from heroin and cocaine to methamphetamine, ecstasy, LSD, and marijuana are 
banned by state and federal law.   
Tobacco imposes high costs on a large proportion of users because the addiction is 
powerful and the health cost of decades of use will likely be great. Nonetheless, consumption 
rates tend to be high because the health costs are temporally distant, and governments tend not to 
prohibit consumption because current productivity and parenting ability are not discernibly 
impaired.  Interestingly, perhaps the greatest domestic success in reducing consumption of 
harmful substances came for this lawful product, engineered largely through tax hikes via the 
settlement of tort litigation against the tobacco companies. 
Other harmful recreational substances vary in terms of addictiveness and the ability of 
large numbers of users to enjoy them sporadically and without substantial health cost or 
productivity impairment for work and parenting.  But for sizeable percentages—perhaps 10 
percent for marijuana users, 15 percent for alcohol and cocaine users, and almost 25 percent for 
heroin users (see Figure 9)—the personal and social costs are dramatic and substantial.  It is 
largely to reduce these costs to this minority of users that governments have banned, and tried to 
keep as many people as possible away from marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin 
(and sought to control various legal pharmaceuticals that similarly seem to be used without 
substantial cost by most while imposing great burdens for some not inconsiderable fraction of 
users). 
Estimates placing the economic costs of illegal drug abuse at levels roughly comparable 
to those costs for alcohol and tobacco underscore that there are no easy choices when it comes to 
drug policy.  Aggressive efforts to limit consumption through a tough penal approach tend to 
restrain the costs from drug use while unleashing the high costs of enforcement and incarceration  
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in a context of increased violence centered around the criminal gangs that run the drug trade.  
Conversely, legalization of alcohol and tobacco drastically reduces enforcement costs with 
respect to these substances while keeping the costs of consumption high.  A cost-minimizing 
approach to drug policy might move us away from a punitive approach to control of the currently 
illegal drugs, while entailing aggressive measures to prevent underage consumption and 
constrain demand.   
On the other hand, while thorough consideration of policy toward legal drugs is beyond 
the scope of the present inquiry, comparisons of their toxicological effects and social costs with 
those attributable to such illegal drugs as marijuana and cocaine suggest that more vigorous 
pursuit of demand-restraint policies for alcohol and tobacco may result in a reduction of the 
social costs of those drugs.  At some point, insights from social science and medical testing may 
be refined enough, and widely enough disseminated, to enable potential users to secure better 
advance notice regarding their particular susceptibility to the serious consequences of drug and 
alcohol abuse.  At present, many individuals find out the hard way, at great cost to themselves 
and society.  Despite the problem of moral hazard, greater treatment seems to offer a more cost 
effective method for dealing with these abusers than criminal penalties. 
Our analysis has also underscored that optimal drug policy is likely to differ from one 
drug to another, since, for example, the impact of government policies—current and 
hypothetical—may be substantially different for an extremely prevalent drug with relatively mild 
toxicological effects, such as marijuana, than for a far less common, but more addictive and 
dangerous drug, such as cocaine. Given the differences in prevalence, user base composition, 
toxicological effects and distribution networks between marijuana and cocaine, depenalization or  
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legalization would impact the magnitude and distribution of social costs in meaningfully 
different ways for these two drugs.    
Yet if reform’s risks and likely impacts upon the distribution of social costs differ from 
drug to drug, our analysis nevertheless concludes that for both cocaine and marijuana, there is 
considerable potential for reducing the overall social costs. Our review of theory and empiricism 
suggests that carefully tailored versions of depenalization or legalization might provide these 
cost-reductions, and additional analytic scrutiny could further clarify their likely impacts. 
In light of the admitted uncertainty in empirical predictions of use rates under 
hypothetical new regimes, and considering the many important values that a cost-minimization 
approach fails to entertain, we are not surprised that many observers fear or dismiss alternatives 
to criminalization.
96 Distributional issues, although under-theorized in the illegal drug policy 
context, arguably underlie much concern about reform. While we follow standard economic 
analysis and treat a dollar in costs equally across contexts, politicians and voters are attentive to 
who bears the costs of alternative policies. Particularly troublesome to opponents of 
legalization—and to a lesser extent depenalization—may be that such reform would redistribute 
many costs away from current drug users, sellers, and the government
97 and on to a new set of 
victims: the new drug users and victims of accidents, a group whose ranks could include one’s 
neighbors, relatives, or even one’s own children. Upper middle class voters with influence over 
policy may believe that marijuana prohibition protects their children by placing costs on lower 
class drug sellers and other countries (such as Mexico).  The supporters of prohibition will point 
to the lower rates of marijuana use by high school seniors today than in the late 1970s as 
evidence for the success of the prohibitionist approach.  But, as Figure 11 illustrates, substantial 
historical drops in tobacco and alcohol consumption by high school seniors show that  
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consumption declines by the young can be engineered even for legal substances. Moreover, 
events from Kabul to Mexico City show that policies of drug prohibition enrich violent forces 
internationally in ways that can impose large indirect costs on the United States. 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
While we refrain from analyzing distributional consequences in depth, we are keenly 
aware of the concern they engender. Our relative optimism about the potential of depenalization 
or legalization to reduce the costs of certain illegal drugs does not come from a sense that such 
drugs are not socially harmful. We believe any serious analysis of reform must be especially 
sensitive to policies for tailoring depenalization or legalization to mitigate costs from increases in 
use.
98 Counter-advertising, treatment, age-restrictions, and policies against driving while under 
the influence—to list just a few such ideas—would together not just alter at the margin but 
integrally affect a new regime for any currently illegal drug.  
  In thinking about various options for reforming policy toward marijuana or cocaine, it is 
helpful to bear in mind that a choice among criminalization, depenalization, and legalization 
could be made with the aim of minimizing social costs, rather than simply curtailing use—the 
socially costly goal toward which our current policy of criminalization seems oriented.  
Maintaining a focus on the social harms of a drug, not just less subtle measures of the prevalence 
of use, helps to clarify the effects of policies that rely predominantly on tough criminal penalties.  
However, even those who would design drug policy principally to minimize use 
prevalence should not discount the potential of a carefully tailored version of depenalization or 
legalization to serve that goal. Consider Becker’s suggestion that if the goal of reduced 
consumption (particularly for the young) is largely derived via maintaining high prices, this goal 
could be achieved at lower social cost by legalizing and taxing up to the level of current price  
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(Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2006).
99  While the merits of this argument will depend upon 
the specifics of the legalization policy and the drugs to which it is applied, some general 
theoretical considerations are worth stressing. 
The socializing impact of legalization and possible attendant product advertising could 
increase individuals’ preference for a socially harmful substance, increasing demand for the drug 
at any given price even if an excise tax were designed to simultaneously keep the price from 
falling too greatly.
100 Moreover, the greater the excise tax, the less effective legalization would 
be at shrinking the black market as illegal dealers would find a higher legal price easier to 
undercut. There is yet another basic tension in Becker’s view: while it assumes consumers are 
responsive predominantly to price rather than the moral command of illegality (and hence its loss 
under legalization is a minimal cost), it also presumes that consumers will largely turn away 
from the lower priced illegal drugs that skirt the excise tax.
101 
Yet although legalization with significant taxation would not eliminate the black market 
for a drug entirely, it would be expected to shrink substantially the size of the illegal market, 
with the attendant cost reductions from less crime.  The remaining black market would also have 
diminished risk and profit margins, thus providing less economic incentive for participants to 
engage in costly crime and violence to maintain their stakes.  Moreover, the additional tax 
revenues could be used to fund greater enforcement to protect the under-aged (as well as to target 
the tax evaders), while providing greater vehicles for treatment for those who succumb to the 
burdens of addiction and abuse. Finally, it is not insignificant that legalization is the only regime 
that does not contemplate untold numbers of illegal transactions by otherwise law-abiding 
individuals, and an attendant diminished respect for, and faith in, the rule of law.
102   
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Similarly, a well-crafted form of depenalization is not necessarily antithetical to the goal 
of discouraging drug use. Like legalization, depenalization could also significantly reduce the 
enforcement costs and productivity losses from the arrest and legal processing of hundreds of 
thousands of marijuana possession cases—and some of the costs from analogous proceedings, 
plus incarceration, in the context of cocaine. Although one might worry that depenalization 
would expand consumption without contracting the black market, and that full decriminalization 
of possession would appear hypocritical when combined with the retention of criminal penalties 
for sale, it is not clear that these concerns would be borne out in practice.  Particularly if 
sanctions were reduced for sale as well as possession, depenalization could, like legalization, 
reduce the risk and reward for illegal market participants, thus diminishing the likelihood of 
violence used to protect their market positions.  Depenalization of possession alone could not 
only reduce enforcement costs but also—as the insights of Kleiman (2009) help show—increase 
the potential swiftness, certainty, and deterrence value per sanction unit, for situations where 
punishments were applied.  It might also help usher in a policy shift toward harm reduction—a 
new orientation toward helping, rather than punishing, the victims of drug abuse.  Rather than 
being an example of hypocritical or morally ambiguous policy, depenalization could be framed 
as a new understanding of which activities are sufficiently harm-producing to merit 
criminalization (i.e., sale) and which aren’t (i.e., possession).  Indeed, the experience of a number 
of European countries suggests that depenalization could reduce the costs of enforcement, 
redirect efforts toward helping problem users, and perhaps even reduce the violence of illegal 
markets, without these gains being outweighed by increased costs from use.
103  
Although our inquiry into illegal drug policy has been a self-conscious search for a cost-
minimizing regime, our evaluation of various policy options can also provide a basis for analysis  
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by those who would prefer simply to minimize use cost-effectively or who would conduct a full 
welfare analysis including the benefits of use for the many casual or moderate users who do not 




                                                 
1 The United States’s incarceration rate of 7.56 per 1,000 people is five to ten times the rate in most 
western and northern European countries.  
2 Under our taxonomy, the libertarian ideal espoused by such scholars as Milton Friedman is a subset of 
legalization in which taxation and regulation would be kept to a minimum. 
3 The terms “depenalization” and “decriminalization” have been used in confusing, misleading, and 
sometimes contradictory ways. The National Research Council (2001, 192) notes: “The term 
‘decriminalization’ has sometimes been misunderstood to refer to ‘legalization’ (i.e., making drugs 
available for nonmedical uses, as in the case of alcohol). However, as used by experts in criminal law and 
popularized by the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse [NCMDA] in 1972, 
‘decriminalization,’ refers to the repeal of criminal sanctions against possession for personal use, even 
though the drugs remain contraband and commercial access remains prohibited. The erroneous 
association between decriminalization and legalization has led some commentators to abandon the term in 
favor of ‘depenalization’ to refer to these more lenient marijuana laws.” Our taxonomy closely tracks the 
usage adopted by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA 2005, 12). 
The EMCDDA uses decriminalization and depenalization in the following ways: “‘[D]ecriminalisation’ 
comprises removal of a conduct or activity from the sphere of criminal law. Prohibition remains the rule, 
but sanctions for use (and its preparatory acts) no longer fall within the framework of the criminal law 
(elimination of the notion of a criminal offence). This may be reflected either by the imposition of 
sanctions of a different kind (administrative sanctions without the establishment of a police record – even 
if certain administrative measures are included in the police record in some countries, such as France), or 
the abolition of all sanctions. . . . ‘[D]epenalisation’ means relaxation of the penal sanction provided for 
by law. In the case of drugs, and cannabis in particular, depenalisation generally signifies the elimination 
of custodial penalties. Prohibition remains the rule, but imprisonment is no longer provided for, even if 
other penal sanctions may be retained (fines, establishment of a police record, or other penal sanctions).” 
We use the term “depenalization” to describe a regime in which possession is punished with sanctions 
other than incarceration, reserving “decriminalization” to refer to regimes in which penalties for 
possession are not just reduced but are entirely removed or diverted from the realm of criminal law.  
In addition to the erroneous association between “decriminalization” as used by the NCMDA in 
the drug context and ordinary understandings of legalization, there are two other important reasons for 
preferring the term depenalization to decriminalization, when describing the general policy of responding 
to possession with fines and/or treatment rather than incarceration. First, some Western European 
countries, for example, make much greater use of fines than the United States for a variety of criminal 
offenses. While fines may strike Americans as non-criminal sanctions, they are routinely used as criminal 
sanctions in some other countries. (For example, Greene (1988) cites a study from the early 1980s finding 
that in West Germany the fine was used as the sole penalty for three-quarters of property crime offenders 
and two thirds of those convicted of assault.) Hence, even if such a country relies primarily—or even 
exclusively—on fines and treatment to punish possession, one cannot thereby conclude that possession 
has necessarily been taken out of the system of criminal law. Second, as Suk (2008) notes with the 
example of employment discrimination law in France, some of those same countries use criminal law as 
the primary means of addressing behavior that in the U.S. is handled primarily through tort law. A more 
expansive domain for criminal law is structurally related to a heavier use of lesser sanctions, such as 
fines, in the criminal context, and it may also mean that criminal sanctions do not automatically trigger 
the degree of stigmatization that they imply in the United States. To the extent that criminal sanctions in 
general carry less of a stigma in some of the countries with less severe punishments for drug offenses, 
those countries’ variations on depenalization appear closer to decriminalization from the perspective of 
the American system and its use of incarceration as the basic sanction of criminal law.  
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One further clarification is in order: in theory, proscription with sanctions other than incarceration 
could be applied to sale, in addition to possession. However, because the application of depenalization to 
both possession and sale would essentially yield a system resembling a highly (though peculiarly) 
regulated legalization, we do not treat the depenalization of possession and sale together as a basic 
regime. Rather, we implicitly relegate such a regime to a subset of legalization and use the term 
“depenalization” to refer to depenalization of possession.  This means than any depenalization of 
possession is likely to be incomplete, because states and countries generally set quantity caps defining the 
limits of non-criminal possession as a way to distinguish ordinary users from sellers.  
4 Contrary to popular perception, Kleiman (2006) notes that depenalization was actually America’s policy 
toward alcohol during prohibition. Alcohol prohibition did not target simple possession but rather 
manufacture, sale, and transportation, and in that sense it was a policy of extreme depenalization.   Cook 
(2007, 19) notes that even when sanctions were imposed for manufacture, sale, or transportation, in 
practice these sanctions tended to consist of only a small fine.   
5 While there is a growing literature examining the experiences of countries and states that have shifted 
from criminalization to depenalization—whether that depenalization is effected de jure, as in Portugal’s 
decriminalization, or de facto, as in the case of some other European countries―there is a dearth of 
evidence on shifts from criminalization to legalization. 
6 Depenalization would reduce these costs less than legalization because criminal justice resources would 
still be used to impose penalties on sellers and even users. The more extreme the depenalization, the 
greater would be the expected reduction in these costs. 
7 The answer to this question largely depends upon the specifics of the new regime. For example, 
depenalization could involve a host of different approaches to enforcement, treatment, and civil penalties, 
while legalization could entail a wide range of policies regarding taxation, product quality regulation, 
advertising, and possession by minors.   
8  A complete normative evaluation of drug policy, even one from a largely consequentalist perspective, 
must necessarily contend with a host of values not amenable to quantification: welfare, liberty, and 
justice, to name an important few.  Despite such limitations, however, a cost-minimization perspective 
has a clarity and relative simplicity that makes it a useful guide for any normative discussion of illegal 
drug policy reform.  
9  There are several reasons for treating these statistics with some caution. First, there are many possible 
metrics for capturing the extent of drug use, and across countries the percentage of people who have tried 
a drug once may be only loosely correlated with the percentage who have used the drug often or recently. 
Second, Room et al. (2008, 60) report: “Since [the] methodology in this study was more uniform than in 
any previous comparison of cannabis use across countries, it would be [sic] appear to be the most 
authoritative source for such statements. However, there are large discrepancies between the findings 
reported in Degenhardt et al. and other well known surveys . . . . Consequently, we have not made use of 
the WMHS data until these discrepancies, which may represent important methodological differences, are 
accounted for.” 
10 For alcohol, Degenhardt et al. (2008) indicate that in terms of cumulative use—i.e., the percentage of 
the population that has ever used a given drug—the United States (at 91.6 percent) is within a few points 
of several West European nations, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
Ukraine, rather than the clear outlier it is in terms of marijuana and cocaine.  Using this same measure for 
tobacco, the United States has the highest cumulative incidence of use, 73.6 percent, of any nation 
studied.  However, the U.S. has had dramatic success in decreasing tobacco consumption since 1985: 
according to World Health Organization data on regular basis smoking, the United States is far from a 
leader, with 20-29 percent of U.S. men reporting smoking regularly.  The analogous percentage is now 
higher in most European countries, as well as in China and Russia―where over 60 percent of men report 
smoking on a regular basis. 
11 If indeed severe sanctions are necessary to keep America’s use rates from rising even higher above 
those of other countries, it is tempting to conclude that Americans must have a greater disposition toward  
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recreational drug use. However, in attempting cross-country comparisons of sanctions and use rates, it is 
important not to lose sight of the broader set of incentives that individuals face. For example, to the extent 
that potential drug sellers choose among a set of possible legal and illegal behaviors, the attractiveness of 
alternative options—including the quality of social welfare networks, the available legal employment, and 
the severity of punishment for other criminal careers—will markedly affect the extent to which each unit 
of punishment deters. The U.S. may need more severe sanctions against drug offenders than Western 
European countries to produce comparable degrees of deterrence not only or simply because Americans 
have a greater cultural propensity to drug use (although this is possible) but also because alternatives to 
selling and using are worse in the United States. Lesser social safety nets and harsher penalties for 
alternative crimes such as property offenses may mean that greater punishment is necessary in the U.S. 
than in some Western European countries in order to make drug selling less attractive than substitute 
behaviors. On the other hand, lower levels of structural unemployment in the U.S. could militate in the 
opposite direction, further complicating the analysis. Thorough analysis of the complex sets of 
alternatives that individuals face which impact the deterrent effect of legal sanctions may be  less critical 
in the drug possession context because drug use and income-producing crimes are unlikely to be strong 
substitute behaviors . Still, it is worth remembering that individual users may choose among broad sets of 
recreational substances, both legal and illegal, that differ somewhat across countries. 
12 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) is sponsored by the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which is a part of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). The survey itself is carried out by the Research Triangle Institute of North 
Carolina (RTI).  RTI selects a random sample of households and draws 70,000 individuals ages twelve 
and over to participate annually.  A professional RTI interviewer visits the household to conduct the 
survey.  The actual interview is administered via laptop computer with the respondent entering most 
answers directly into the computer such that the interviewer does not know the respondent’s answers to 
the questions.  Respondents receive $30 in cash following the interview.  For further information, see 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, https://nsduhweb.rti.org/. 
13 For example, Joseph Califano Jr., president of the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
at Columbia University (CASA) and former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, uses addiction 
estimates in just this way, writing: “Today, we have 50 million nicotine addicts, 18 million alcoholics and 
alcohol abusers, and 6 million drug addicts. It is logical to conclude that, if drugs are easier to obtain, less 
expensive, and socially acceptable, more individuals will use them. With legalization, experts believe the 
number of cocaine addicts alone could jump beyond the number of alcoholics” (Trebach and Califano 
2010).  
14 Speaking on Portugal’s experience with decriminalization of illegal drugs, Manuel Cardoso, deputy 
director of the Institute for Drugs and Drugs Addiction in Portugal, has said: “Before decriminalization, 
addicts were afraid to seek treatment because they feared they would be denounced to the police and 
arrested. . . . Now they know they will be treated and not stigmatized as criminals” (Treating Not 
Punishing 2009).  
15 One way for someone caught in possession of marijuana to reduce one’s expected sentence is to enter 
treatment.  Many marijuana treatment admissions are criminal justice referrals (Room et al. 2008, 86). In 
that sense, the rise in arrests for possession of marijuana in the past two decades has been a factor 
contributing to an increase in the number of marijuana users seeking treatment—although it may be 
difficult to accurately estimate the number of individuals who did not seek treatment under the current 
criminalization regime, but who would have sought treatment had marijuana been depenalized or 
legalized.   
16 In a famous concurrence in Powell v. Texas, Justice White put it this way: “If it cannot be a crime to 
have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics . . . I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to 
yield to such a compulsion.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
17 Reviewing the “four largest, most methodologically rigorous studies of psychiatric disorders and their 
correlates,” Heyman (2009, 69-88) finds that high remission rates are characteristic of addiction.  Heyman  
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also finds the widespread belief that addiction is a chronic disorder to be unsupported by the best 
available data (73-74). 
18 This intuitively plausible prediction is backed by evidence demonstrating that addiction is much more 
or less likely to spread depending upon social context. Heyman (2009, 31-43) reviews the influences of 
cohort and social context on addiction rates and finds that both are significant, despite the biological basis 
of addiction.  Contrary to received wisdom, Heyman argues convincingly that “[a]ddiction is not an 
equal-opportunity disorder; indeed there is no psychiatric disorder that is more closely tied to 
circumstance” (39).  
19 Grossman, Chaloupka, and Anderson (1998) find that the Becker-Murphy model—in which demand for 
addictive goods is sensitive to past, current and future price—is consistent with some empirical studies of 
the demand for cigarettes, alcohol and cocaine, which find negative effects of price on demand, positive 
effects of past and future consumption on demand, and greater price elasticities of demand over longer 
time horizons. Other economic models of addiction exist, however, that have treated addicts as myopic or 
holding inconsistent short and long term preferences. 
20 Becker and Murphy (1988, 695) put it this way: “We do not claim that all idiosyncratic behavior 
associated with particular kinds of addictions are consistent with rationality.”  
21 Becker and Murphy write: “Permanent changes in prices of addictive goods may have a modest short-
run effect on the consumption of addictive goods. This could be the source of a general perception that 
addicts do not respond much to changes in price. However, we show that the long-run demand for 
addictive goods tends to be more elastic than the demand for nonaddictive goods” (1988, 694-95). 
22 The assumption underlying this statement is that the probability of commencing abuse drops sharply 
after adolescence, while those who begin abuse are put on a less favorable subsequent life path.  As a 
result, one would observe that most abusers start early and have worse life outcomes.  Of course, this 
pattern could also appear if there were simply two types of individuals—those prone to abusing drugs 
(that is, those with high probabilities of commencing abuse and having poor life outcomes) and those not 
so prone―and individuals in the first group tended to begin abuse in their teen years.  Thus, heterogeneity 
with stable probabilities could generate the observed pattern in a way that would indicate that delaying 
initiation of abuse would not reduce the number of abusers over the life span.  Of course, it might still be 
desirable to delay addiction to prevent it from stymieing education or growth.  
23 In reporting data on drug use over time, it is important to keep in mind the variety of ways in which use 
can be measured.  Prevalence of use is the most common use measure, measuring the percentage who 
have tried a substance, rather than the quantities or potencies used or distribution of use among users.  
Prevalence is only a proxy for an ideal measure of use severity that would somehow incorporate and 
weight prevalence, intensity, potency, and other factors contributing to social harms generated by a 
population’s drug problem. Among prevalence statistics the most commonly reported are lifetime, last 
year, and last month.  Each of these time horizons carries with it advantages and disadvantages.  Lifetime 
use figures pick up all those who have ever tried a substance, even if just one time, thus giving a sense of 
how common it has been for a member of a given population to try a substance.  By looking across an 
individual’s lifetime, however, such measures necessarily obscure the severity of prevalence at narrower 
moments in time (e.g., “now” or “in recent years”).  If many people try a drug once or just several times, 
but drug use problems stem from perpetual users, the measure can be a poor proxy for the severity of the 
current problem of drug use within a population.  Looking at use during the last year or last month 
illuminates the severity of the drug problem within a population at a narrower moment in time, and places 
more emphasis on relatively frequent users than lifetime use measures.  However, these shorter time 
horizons fail to capture the likelihood that an individual in a given population will try or come to abuse 
the drug in the long-run.    
24 Monitoring the Future (MTF), sponsored by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, has been a mainstay of data collection regarding drug use in the United States since 1975.  
MTF consists of an annual survey of 16,000 seniors from public and private high schools across the 
contiguous United States.  Random sampling procedures are used to select 133 schools for research, with  
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a maximum of 350 students surveyed within each school.  Ten days prior to administration of the survey, 
students are given a flyer that explains the purpose of the study and provides notice to parents of the 
study, giving each parent an opportunity to refuse their child’s participation.  Institute for Social Research 
staff administer the questionnaire in classrooms during normal class periods following procedures 
outlined in a project instruction manual.  All student responses remain confidential.  For more 
information, visit http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/purpose.html. 
25 This important insight has long been recognized—at least by many advocates of some form of drug 
legalization. Kleiman and Saiger (1990, 539) note: “A central accomplishment of the consequentialist 
proponents of legalization has been to stress the vital distinction between the costs of drug abuse and the 
costs of drug control.” 
26 The war on drugs increased the number of drug offenders in federal prisons by 26 percent from 2000 to 
2006, bringing the number to over 93,000 and accounting for over 53 percent of the increase in the federal 
prison population during this same time period (Sabol, Couture and Harrison 2007, 9). Sabol, West and 
Cooper (2009, 37-38) report that the numbers of drug offenders in state and federal prison were 265,800 
(in 2006) and 95,079 (in 2008), respectively (those in jail are not counted in these numbers). 
27 Marijuana possession accounted for 59.8 percent of the cases evaluated for prosecution by U.S. 
Attorneys for simple possession, whereas powder cocaine and crack cocaine accounted for 11 and 10.3 
percent, respectively (BJS 2001, 3).  For drug trafficking offenses, marijuana was involved in 30.7 
percent of evaluated cases, with powder cocaine and crack cocaine being involved in 28.2 and 15.5 
percent of cases, respectively.  
28 Because offenders may have been involved with multiple substances, the figures do not add up to 100 
percent. 
29 The American Corrections Association estimates that the average cost of incarcerating state prison 
inmates is $67.55 per day, or around $25,000 per prisoner per year (ACA 2006). Combining this estimate 
with one from Sabol, West and Cooper (2009, 21) that 265,800 state prisoners are currently serving 
sentences for drug offenses yields an annual cost of state drug incarceration of $6.6 billion. If the total 
population of convicts incarcerated in jail and state and federal prison is approximately half-a-million, it 
is reasonable to think that the total costs of incapacitating drug offenders each year may be in the 
neighborhood of $13 billion.  
30 Prevalence of use of illegal drugs is modestly higher among African-Americans than Caucasians 
(SAMHSA 2008, 25). The 2007 NSDUH reported past month illicit drug use rates of 9.5 percent among 
“blacks or African-Americans” and 8.2 percent among whites.  While these data are useful at dispelling 
popular notions that drug use is vastly disproportionate among African-Americans, a comparison between 
the percentage of past-month drug users by race and the percentage of drug-abuse offense prisoners by 
race does not in and of itself demonstrate disparate enforcement of drug laws against African-Americans.  
Because most people imprisoned for drug-related offenses are imprisoned for drug trafficking and dealing 
rather than simple possession, and because the indicator of illegal drug use prevalence does not identify 
either the type of drug or severity of use, the highly aggregated demographic comparison of illicit drug 
users with individuals incarcerated on drug offenses must be interpreted cautiously. 
31 We believe that Portugal’s self-described policy of “decriminalization” is appropriately characterized 
(whereas some other laws—such as American states’ reforms in the 1970s—have been misleadingly 
called decriminalization) because Portugal has by law explicitly designated short-supply possession as an 
“administrative offence” subject only to civil fines (Greenwald 2009; Treating Not Punishing 2009).  
32 It appears that even treatment imposed as a condition for suspension of a fine may not be enforced 
rigorously (Greenwald 2009, 3). On the other hand, the Dissuasion Commissions are theoretically 
empowered to levy other non-criminal sanctions such as the revocation of certain privileges. 
33  The Argentine Court’s reasoning is similar to that of an earlier Alaska Supreme Court decision.  In 
Ravin v. State the Alaska Supreme Court held that Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution (“The 
right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”) protected people's right to 
possess marijuana in their own homes for personal use.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).  
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More recently the Alaska Court of Appeals interpreted Ravin as applying only to possession of small 
amounts of marijuana and upheld an Alaska statute prohibiting possession of eight ounces of marijuana.  
Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Alaska App. 1999). 
34 This study uses the cost-of-illness (COI) methodology. The COI methodology evaluates both the direct 
costs from drug abuse, such as medical expenditures on treatment of drug users, and indirect costs, such 
as work missed due to drug induced illness.  This method can be contrasted with the willingness-to-pay 
methodology, which computes the public’s willingness to pay for the avoidance of a small amount of 
additional harm. 
35 “As used in this report and throughout most of the literature on economic costs, the term ‘alcohol 
abuse’ refers to any cost-generating aspect of alcohol consumption. This differs from the clinical 
definition of the term, which involves specific diagnostic criteria” (Harwood 2000, 1). An early aggregate 
cost study, Rice et al. (1991), estimated economic costs for 1988 of $58.3 billion for drug abuse and $85.8 
billion for alcohol abuse. A subsequent study, Rice (1999), estimated that in 1995 there were $114.2 
billion in costs from drug abuse and $175.9 billion in costs from alcohol abuse. 
36 These figures, rounded to the nearest billion, were computed using the CPI-based inflation adjustment 
calculator of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
37 Of course, whether and to what extent drugs benefit their users is not just an empirical question but also 
a normative one. For a brief and lucid discussion of various perspectives on the role of drug use benefits 
in policy assessment, see MacCoun and Reuter (2001, 70). The authors note that whereas some 
economists such as Becker and Murphy argue that the principle of revealed preference evinces benefits 
for drug users, others such as Kleiman are skeptical of such an argument given that certain drugs 
“instigate neurological and psychological processes that motivate compulsive use.”  
38 In noting the limitations of its scope and reliability, the ONDCP’s 2004 cost study, ONDCP (2004, vi) 
points to four brief critiques of the value of such estimates: Reuter (1999a), Kleiman (1999), Kopp 
(1999), and Cohen (1999). For an argument that such economic costs of drug use studies do not help 
illuminate the relative merits of prohibition or alternative policies, see Miron (2003). 
39 Since Secretary Clinton’s remarks in March 2009, the news media have reported a flurry of stories 
concerning the violence in the Mexican drug trade.  One particularly gruesome tale published in the New 
York Times in October 2009 reported the arrest of Santiago Meza Lopez who had admitted to disposing 
of the remains of 300 bodies for a drug cartel by dissolving them in lye.  The lye corroded the remains to 
the point where DNA could not be recovered to identify the bodies.  Due to such tactics, many people 
involved in the Mexican drug trade disappear each year (Lacey 2009).  While Mexican drug smugglers 
are often depicted as cocaine dealers, marijuana remains the largest source of revenue for Mexican drug 
cartels.  Even though Mexican growers are starting to face stiff competition from “mom and pop” U.S. 
producers of pot, the White House Office of National Drug Control reports that in 2006 over 60 percent 
of Mexican cartels’ revenue ($8.6 billion out of $13.8 billion) came from U.S. marijuana sales (Fainaru 
and Booth 2009). Mexican traffickers have also established marijuana crops in remote American forests 
where they have shot at U.S. law enforcement agents, polluted rivers with pesticides and fertilizers, and 
started large fires.  Most recently, the Associated Press has reported on the $25 billion each year in profits 
from drug trafficking in the United States that Mexican cartels send to Mexico from the United States (AP 
2009).  In spite of attempts by the U.S. Treasury to stop this flow of funds, the AP reports that $99.75 of 
every $100 sent by the cartels makes it to Mexico. 
40 Caulkins and Kleiman (2007, 591) summarize the quandary in the cocaine context: “Unless the taxes 
and regulations involved in a post-prohibition control regime for cocaine were so high and so tight as to 
leave the current illicit market largely in place, the result would almost certainly be a very large increase 
in the number of heavy cocaine users . . . . Against that must be set the enormous reduction in violence 
and incarceration that would result from abolishing the illicit market in cocaine. (The net impact on 
property crime is unclear; users, presumably, would steal less, but some dealers, deprived of their 
customers by legal competition, might switch to theft as a source of illicit income. On the other hand,  
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legalization would free substantial police, prosecution, and prison resources for use against predatory 
crime.).” 
41 Another concern that is difficult to assess is the extent to which current drug dealers would substitute 
toward other criminal enterprises were a liberalization of illegal drug policy to contract the black market 
and its profitability.  
42 In this section we consider drug policy primarily from the standpoint of cost-minimization analysis.  A 
final assessment on desirable social policy would consider other important concerns such as individual 
liberty, distributional justice, and which side of the controversy (those who would maintain the status quo 
or those who would enact reform) bears the burden of uncertainty.  However, due to limited space and our 
interest in clarifying the social science, we do not give such concerns full treatment, but instead simply 
note some evidence that might be relevant to the application of these non-efficiency based criteria.  For a 
discussion seeking to reframe the marijuana policy debate in terms of “just deserts” for offenders, see 
Husak (2007, 189).  A comprehensive treatment—and indeed a true cost-benefit analysis—of various 
schemes would also require serious consideration of the benefits of drugs to their users. To the extent that 
reforms such as depenalization or legalization would increase the benefits to users through increased 
consumption, for example, our decision to ignore benefits biases our analysis in favor of the status quo 
and makes any favorable assessments of such reforms all the more cautiously derived.  
43 A persistent critique of arguments for “legalization” has been that they paint overly rosy pictures of the 
consequences of legalization by omitting the specifics—such as the forms of regulation, distribution 
mechanisms, level of taxation, treatment of marketing, and special policies toward young people—that if 
considered in detail would surely reveal the shortcomings of legalization.  
44 At the extreme, this posture often entails language implicitly denying that legal drugs such as alcohol 
and nicotine are drugs at all. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) exploits this distinction in 
opposing legalization. “The Legalization Lobby claims drugs are no more dangerous than alcohol,” the 
DEA writes in its summary of the top ten “facts” on legalization (DEA 2003, 3). This statement implicitly 
perpetuates the myths that (1) alcohol is not a drug; and (2) the substances properly called drugs are 
illegal.    
45 John Kaplan’s The Hardest Drug:  Heroin and Public Policy (1983) provides a classic example of the 
approach of focusing on the costs and benefits of a single drug, while drawing comparisons with other 
drugs.  Written on the eve of the American crack “epidemic,” Kaplan considered the costs of heroin use, 
formerly considered to be the country’s most problematic drug, and explored the costs and benefits of 
possible systems of legalization and heroin maintenance.  Kaplan’s careful weighing of costs and benefits 
for a particular drug provides an example of a strong methodological framework for those conducting 
research in this area. 
46 Caulkins and Kleiman (2007, 564) estimate that “cocaine (including crack) accounts for roughly two-
thirds of the social costs associated with illicit drugs in the United States.” 
47 “Data from non-western countries are much sparser, but suggest more variation and lower rates” (Room 
et al. 2008, 61). There are several reasons why lifetime use data are more amenable to cross-country 
comparison. First, lifetime use figures are likely to fluctuate less over short periods of time because (a) 
people who have used during their lifetimes will not drop out of the pool of those who have ever used 
until they die, and (b) those who begin using between sampling periods will make up a smaller percentage 
of those who have ever used than those who have used during the past year because at any time far more 
people will have ever used than used in the past year. The most recent use figures for different countries 
are often for slightly different years. The smaller the expected changes in use from year to year, the lesser 
the extent to which different sampling years render statistics from two different countries incomparable.  
Second, lifetime use figures using a uniform methodology are available from at least one recent study, the 
WHO World Mental Health Surveys, whereas the most comprehensive cross-country data for past year 
use of which we are aware come from the World Drug Report 2009, and are pulled together from 
disparate studies done within individual nations and with somewhat differing methodologies.   
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48 Far fewer—indeed just a small fraction—are actually imprisoned for marijuana possession. Caulkins 
and Kleiman (2007, 581) write: “There are more than 1 million arrests per year in the United States for 
drug possession . . . but few of them result in prison time, or even jail time following a conviction. That is 
especially true of cannabis possession, even in states where it is not formally ‘decriminalized.’ Possession 
of quantities suitable for personal consumption by itself is usually punished, if at all, with probation, 
fines, community service, or shorter jail terms, not prison sentences.” 
49 That relatively few marijuana users persist in their habit beyond their youth raises two important 
questions, however. First, to what extent is this consumption pattern the result of the existing punitive 
policy? Second, to what extent does uncertainty about the first question undermine our confidence in the 
long-term consequences of marijuana use? 
50 For example, “in 2004 the three leading Democratic hopefuls—John Kerry, Howard Dean, and John 
Edwards—all acknowledged without quibbling that they’d smoked pot” (Hertzberg 2008). 
51 A list of the names is available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers.html. 
52 Milton Friedman, George Akerlof, and Vernon Smith.  
53 More recently Miron has expanded upon that report, analyzing the budgetary implications of the 
prohibition of all other illegal drugs—including cocaine and heroin specifically (Miron 2008).  
54 Preferences for drugs are likely to be in significant part endogenous—i.e., not independent of, but 
rather, partly determined by, policy and market structure. However, while most assume that 
criminalization reduces the aggregate demand for drugs, the policy regime undoubtedly affects 
individuals in differing ways. For some, the resulting social stigma makes drug use or dealing far less 
attractive at any given price whereas, for others, a contrary lure of heresy and rebellion makes such 
activities more desirable at each price.    
55 A related issue is whether marijuana is an economic substitute for, or complement to, alcohol and 
cigarettes.  Williams et al. (2004), for example, find some evidence that marijuana and alcohol are 
complements, and therefore increases in the price of alcohol decrease marijuana use. DiNardo and 
Lemieux (2001), on the other hand, find evidence that increases in the minimum drinking age were 
associated with slight increases in marijuana use, suggesting a substitution effect. We are skeptical that 
such studies can resolve the issue of whether marijuana and alcohol or marijuana and cigarettes are 
substitutes or complements—much less how the overall price decreases in marijuana from depenalization 
or legalization would affect alcohol or cigarette use—because it is unlikely that marijuana and alcohol or 
marijuana and cigarettes have stable relationships in individuals’ preference relations across social 
contexts and historical time periods. Even if such a stable relation were uncovered given marijuana 
criminalization, this would not ensure that the relationship would persist after marijuana reform—
especially legalization.  
56 Reviewing the literature, two analysts write: “The psychopharmacological model hypothesizes that 
drug users engage in violent and/or non-violent crime because of the acute psychoactive effects of the 
substance. . . . There is very little support for this model in the case of marijuana, except for adolescents. 
Laboratory studies generally show that marijuana, unlike alcohol, temporarily inhibits aggression and 
violence . . . raising doubt that any association identified in the data is causal in nature.  Still, there is 
some evidence showing a correlation between chronic marijuana use and increased risk of violent 
behavior” (Pacula and Kilmer 2003, 4). The results of the authors’ own models, using Arrestee Drug 
Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) and Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data, suggest a possible causal 
mechanism between marijuana use and arrests for property and income-producing crime, but are too 
conflicting to affirm or refute the existence of a causal relationship between marijuana use and violent 
crime arrests. Even if one were to take a leap from their relatively mixed evidence and conclude that a 
causal relationship between marijuana use and non-violent crime arrests exists, however, the nature of 
that relationship remains elusive: perhaps most problematic is the possibility that a positive association 
between marijuana use and arrest likelihood may be a reflection of marijuana users’ greater likelihood of 
arrest conditional on committing a crime—rather than greater likelihood of committing crimes. At best 
the authors’ analysis offers weak and indirect support for the thesis that marijuana induces non-violent  
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crime at all, much less toxicologically.  
57 So-called “broken windows” policing is a strategy wherein law enforcement cracks down on minor 
offenses as a means of preventing antisocial behavior from escalating into more serious crimes. The 
strategy was advanced in James Q. Wilson’s and George Kelling’s article Broken Windows:  The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  
58  Not only did the authors find evidence against the “broken windows” theory of policing, they also 
observed that African-Americans and Hispanics were much more likely to be arrested for MPV and to 
fare poorly in the criminal justice system thereafter.  
59 Room, et al. (2008, 105), explain: “Predominantly, these state laws downgraded the legal status of 
marijuana possession offences, defining possession of small amounts as a misdemeanor, i.e. reducing the 
severity of penalties following violations while retaining them formally as criminally sanctioned offenses 
under this offense rubric. Thus, while these reforms have widely been labeled as ‘decriminalization,’ it 
has been suggested that this may have been a misnomer in strict terms. . . .’” In one respect, there is a 
common denominator among the state reform laws that makes them somewhat like, though not strictly 
examples of, our particular conception of a “depenalization” regime: as Pacula et al. (2004, 9) note “[t]he 
only common denominator across these eleven statutes was the lack of imposition of minimum jail/prison 
terms.”  The failure to specify minimum terms of incarceration is not the same as the removal of any 
incapacitating sanctions, however.  If decriminalization strictly refers to a regime of sanctions outside the 
criminal system, some of the states’ reform laws approach this ideal more closely than others: some 
downgraded possession of a small quantity of marijuana to a misdemeanor while others downgraded the 
offense to a violation (Pacula et al. 2004). 
60 The 2001 NRC report noted that “most cross-state comparisons in the United States . . . have found no 
significant differences in the prevalence of marijuana use in decriminalized and nondecriminalized states  
. . . . Even in the few studies that find an effect on prevalence it is a weak one” (NRC 2001, 192-93). 
61 MacCoun et al. (2009, 366-67) write: “Our study finds significant associations between the maximum 
penalty specified in state marijuana laws and a citizen’s perceived maximum penalties.  But the 
associations are very small in magnitude.  Citizens in decriminalization states are only about 29 percent 
more likely to believe the maximum penalty for possessing an ounce of marijuana is a fine or probation 
(relative odds ratio = 1.29).  About a third of citizens in each type of state believe the maximum penalty is 
a jail sentence.  People are not oblivious to their marijuana laws, but the average citizen’s awareness is 
pretty tenuous.  This fact, combined with prior evidence for only weak effects of perceived sanction 
severity on offending . . . goes a long way toward clarifying why decriminalization effects are fairly weak 
and inconsistent.” 
62 As van der Gouwe, Ehrlich, and van Laar (2009) explain, possession remains illegal and subject to 
incarceration and fines, but those found in possession of fewer than five grams of cannabis will not be 
subject to prosecution. Because the Netherlands’ policy systematically removes these low-level 
possession cases from the criminal system, despite retaining nominal prohibition, it may appropriately be 
termed de facto decriminalization or extreme depenalization.  
63 The survey methodology used by the European School Survey Project was modeled after that used by 
the Monitoring the Future study performed in the United States. 
64 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14, which states that “it shall be an exception from the state’s criminal laws 
for any patient or primary care-giver in lawful possession of a registry identification card to engage or 
assist in the medical use of marijuana.” 
65 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2009). 
66 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.71 (West 2009). 
67 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.775 (West 2009), which provides that people with valid 
medical marijuana identification cards who “associate within the state of California collectively or 
cooperatively to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes, shall not solely on the basis of that fact be 
subject to state criminal sanctions. . . .” 
68 People v. Mentch, 195 P.3d 1061, 1068 (Cal. 2008).  
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69 Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008).   
70 Taxing socially harmful substances will enhance social welfare to the extent that it corrects for 
externalities (and internalities).  The tax revenues themselves are mere transfers from drug users and drug 
sellers to the government, although to the extent that the drug cartels are outside the United States, there 
may be some transfer of wealth away from countries such as Mexico to the United States.  See generally, 
Kaplow (2004). 
71 “Caulkins and Pacula (2006) analyzed the National Survey on Drug Use and Health and found that 
most users reported that they acquired their marijuana from a friend (89%) and for free (58%)” (Room et 
al. 2008, 74).  
72 Room, et al. (2008, 74-75) put it this way: “Violence is not commonly found in cannabis markets. This 
is mostly an inference from the absence of reports rather than any positive information that disputes 
between market participants are resolved amicably and that competition for territory is lacking. . . . The 
fact that the market is so imbedded in social networks may be an important factor in explaining the lack 
of violence.”  Much of the violence over marijuana distribution in the U.S. is taking place in Mexico, 
which is plagued by a shocking level of drug-cartel related violence. 
73 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
74 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (invalidating Rhode Island ban on 
advertising liquor prices). 
75 See Capital Broadcasting Company v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Capital 
Broad. Company v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).   
76 Complaint, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, No. 00-117 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2009). 
77 Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).  
78 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525-26 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 531-32. 
81 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, art. 36, Mar. 25, 1961. 
82 See, for example, critiques of STRIDE price data (NRC 2001, 108-17). 
83 That many authors focus on America’s experience with alcohol prohibition and its repeal—
notwithstanding the fact that both took place over 75 years ago, when social and economic conditions 
were quite different than today—is evidence of the dearth of American experience with transitions from 
some form of prohibition to legalization. 
84 Belenko (1993, 40) reports that studies of crack smokers indicate “injury to the bronchial pathways,” 
“lung irritation and inflammation, resulting in shortness of breath,” “decreased ability to exchange air,” 
pulmonary edema, and “pulmonary hemorrhaging possibly caused by the vasoconstricting action of 
cocaine.” 
85 4.1 percent of the murders were categorized as “multidimensional,” meaning that they are drug-related 
but that they fit into more than one of these categories.  Of the murders involving drugs, 22 percent 
involved cocaine and 54 percent involved crack.     
86 Dills, Miron, and Summers (2008) find that for certain regressions on the homicide rate, an index of 
drug prohibition spending enters as a statistically significant independent variable. We follow Miron’s 
original paper in using Vital Statistics rather than Uniform Crime Rates, for data on the homicide rate 
(Miron, 1999, 90).  
87 We used the Hildreth-Lu correction for serial correlation in all our regressions. 
88 We also tested the entire available time span using Eckberg’s adjusted pre-1933 homicide rate for the 
same purpose of identifying to what extent Miron’s initial finding depended upon the early 20
th century 
and its questionable data. 
89 Given the limitations of national time series data we deliberately chose not to replicate Miron’s more 
heavily controlled specifications—from either his original 1999 paper or his more recent broader study of 
economic analysis of crime, due to concern about  drawing strong conclusions from national time series 
data and the misleading sense of definitiveness such specifications might suggest. This should in no way  
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diminish the insights into model sensitivity that we reveal here.   Indeed to the extent that results differ 
with certain alternative specifications in Miron’s own partial follow up paper, this only reaffirms the 
central importance of model specification. Moreover, given our skepticism about the possibility of 
comprehensively modeling the determinants of homicide using the relatively thin device that is national 
time series data, the problem of specification cannot simply be solved here by identifying some a priori 
ideal set of controls and focusing on regressions including them.  
90 For a description of Miron’s drug prohibition enforcement spending index and a variation thereof using 
projected rather than actual expenditures, which he also tested, see Miron (1999, 92-93). The drug 
spending index for which Miron and Dills sent us data was equal to annual spending in hundreds of 1992 
dollars per capita.  
91 For a brief concise discussion of state versus federal spending on drug control, see Boyum and Reuter 
(2005, 44). The authors note that state spending data are far sparser than federal spending data but the 
state data that do exist suggest state spending likely exceeds federal spending and is also probably more 
enforcement oriented than federal spending.  
92 The most recent figures from the U.S. Sentencing Commission indicate that in Fiscal Year 2008, 79.8 
percent of those sentenced for offenses related to crack cocaine were Black, 10.4 percent were White, 8.8 
percent were Hispanic, and 1 percent were “other.” For powder cocaine, the relevant figures are 30.2 
percent Black, 16.6 percent White, 52.3 percent Hispanic, and 1.0 percent “other.” These data include 
those sentenced for drug trafficking, drug offenses occurring near a protected location, continuing 
criminal enterprise, use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug offense, renting or managing a 
drug establishment, and simple possession (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2008a). As would be expected 
given the higher mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine as compared with powder cocaine, 
statistics from this same source indicate that defendants convicted on charges involving crack cocaine 
have median sentences of 97 months, compared with a median of 70 months for those convicted of 
offenses involving powder cocaine (U.S. Sentencing Commission 2008b). 
93 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). 
94 The authors focus on federal mandatory minimum sentences because even though most of those 
imprisoned for possessing and distributing cocaine are in state prisons, they wish to capture the overall 
impact of mandatory sentencing laws rather than analyzing state-to-state differences in such laws.   
95 The exact method by which Caulkins, et al. derive the 0.004 percent increase in cocaine prices is as 
follows.  They begin with an estimate from Mark Kleiman that a cocaine dealer needs to be compensated 
between $25,000 and $50,000 to incur a risk of spending one year in prison, choosing $37,500 because it 
is in the middle of Kleiman’s range.  They then divide this $37,500 by $25,000 (the cost of incarcerating a 
prisoner for one year) to determine that every $1 spent by the government on incarceration imposes a cost 
of $1.50 on dealers, thus meaning that for every $1 million spent on incarceration, cocaine costs increase 
by $1.5 million.  Caulkins, et al. then use a cocaine price of $129.20 per gram and a sales quantity of 
291,200 kg per year to calculate that $37.6 billion is spent on cocaine in the United States each year.  
Finally, they divide the $1.5 million increase in the cost of cocaine by $37.6 billion to find a 0.004 
percent increase in the price of cocaine for every $1 million spent on incarceration.        
96 We also note that many vocal pundits have vested interests in maintaining the status quo 
criminalization—a reality that helps explain both much opposition to reform among commentators and 
the political intractability of illegal drug policy reform. An entire federal bureaucracy, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) has been created to enforce the current prohibition regime, the prison 
guard unions benefit enormously from the large number of prisoners kept behind bars on drug-related 
charges, and a multi-million dollar industry has emerged to supply the pre-employment drug screening 
needs of large employers of low-wage workers such as Wal-Mart and Target. The drug-testing industry 
may be the group most opposed to changes involving the reduction of penalties for marijuana use.  In the 
typical urinalysis used in pre-employment drug screens, the detection window for marijuana is longer 
than that for drugs considered more serious, such as cocaine (Boyum and Reuter 2005, 82).  Thus while 
private employers may continue to require drug screens prior to employment, anything that would make  
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marijuana use more acceptable and thus less of a basis for screening out employment candidates could 
significantly damage the drug testing industry. 
97 While it is easy to appreciate in theory that costs borne by the government are channeled back to 
society at large through higher taxes and/or forgone spending, such costs are spread diffusely and the 
individual taxpayer cannot easily measure changes in her burden, if she can perceive them at all. 
98 In at least one important way, increases in use of a legalized drug would be inherently much less 
harmful than increases in use when a drug is proscribed: they would not contribute to the black market 
and its associated violence and crime. Would domestic violence and date rape increase?  These are 
concerns, but in periods of declining crime, domestic violence also tends to fall, so the problem might be 
mitigated. 
99 Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2006, 38) argue that where demand or supply for a good is inelastic, 
“a monetary tax could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than optimal enforcement 
against the same good would if it were illegal, even though some producers may go underground to avoid 
a monetary tax.”  
100 Depenalization might be less likely to present this particular problem, although it is worth pondering 
whether a regime of legalization coupled with counter-advertising might be able to avoid the appearance 
of governmental toleration of drugs and convey an official stance of discouraging use. 
101 Greater product information and lesser risk of contamination would provide significant reasons for 
consumers to prefer the legal markets, but could also, undesirably, stimulate new demand—not just divert 
existing demand from illegal markets to legal ones.  
102 One possible exception to this otherwise straightforward observation is the case of drugs—such as 
marijuana—that can be produced domestically with relative ease. Full decriminalization of marijuana 
possession could substantially erode the number of illegal marijuana sales by diverting consumers toward 
home cultivation for personal use. 
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Table 1: Regressions of the Homicide Rate on Prohibition Enforcement 
  Miron (1999)  Donohue, Ewing & Peloquin 






































































































































































































































2 .53  .94  .72 .02 .20 .20 .45 .60  .01  .81  .80 
Adj. R
2  *  *  .70 .01 .13 .12  .40  .54 -.02 .75 .74  
  89
Table 1 notes: 
In his original paper Miron reported Newey and West t-statistics and incorporated a trend term; 
however, he did not specify in his article a chosen maximum lag order of autocorrelation for the 
Newey-West approach and did not further elaborate on the construction of his trend term. We 
regressed the homicide rate on Miron’s chosen variables using the Hildreth-Lu correction for 
serial correlation. We report standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate that the coefficient 
was not reported. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 5 percent level; 
coefficients in bold and underlined are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Figure 6: Federal Drug Control Spending, 1986-2001 (Billions of 2008 Dollars) 
 
Source: Nominal figures from ONDCP (2002, 10-11) and ONDCP (1998, 16). 
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Source: Kershaw and Cathcart (2009).  
 
Figure 10: Homicide Rate (Per 100,000 Persons) v. Drug Prohibition Enforcement Index (Hundreds of 1992 Dollars Per Capita) 
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Source: Data supplied by Angela Dills and Jeffrey Miron (homicide rate from U.S. Vital Statistics; prohibition enforcement 
expenditures based on Miron (1999) with data from the Budget of the United States Government (various years))  
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